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The Reclaiming Seller Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act: Resolution or
Renewal of an Old Conflict?
Richard A. Mann* and Michael J. Phillips**
Among the troubling legal questions confronting Congress when
it considered and enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 was
the conflict between the bankruptcy trustee and the seller who at-
tempts to reclaim goods delivered to an insolvent or nearly insolvent
buyer shortly before the buyer's final descent into bankruptcy. This
conflict, which began nearly twenty years ago shortly after the first
states adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code), has
usually pitted the trustee against credit sellers proceeding under
U.C.C. section 2-702. Although clashes between the trustee and
Code cash sellers utilizing U.C.C. sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)
have occurred less often, they have also figured prominently in the
development of the conflict. It has generated a body of case law
notable for its intricacy, its profusion of doctrinal approaches, and
its general incoherence, and has also provoked a sizeable amount of
scholarly commentary.' The changes made by the Bankruptcy Re-
* Associate Professor of Business Law, School of Business Administration, University of
North Carolina (Chapel Hill). B.S., 1968 University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill); J.D.,
1973, Yale University.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University (Bloom-
ington). B.A., 1968, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1973, Columbia University; LL.M.,
1975, George Washington University.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 to 151326 (West
Supp. 1979)). The portions of this act relevant here became effective on October 1, 1979. Id.
§ 101. Throughout this article, the terms "Bankruptcy Reform Act," "Reform Act," and
"New Act" will be used to refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The previous Act will
usually be referred to as the "Bankruptcy Act."
2. For articles principally devoted to the credit seller, see, e.g., Anderson, The Reclaim-
ing Seller Under UCC Section 2-702 vs. His Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 271 (1976); Ashe, Reclamation Under UCC-An Exercise in Futility: Defrauded Seller
v. Trustee in Bankruptcy, 43 REP. J. 78 (1969); Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods by Unse-
cured Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 DRAKE L. Rev. 357 (1975); Braucher,
Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1281 (1967); Countryman,
Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. REv. 435 (1971); Hawkland, The
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form Act are certain to affect the future course of this dispute.
This Article will assess the impact of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act upon the conflict of the Code cash and credit sellers with the
trustee in bankruptcy. The article will begin by discussing the legal
position of the reclaiming seller 3 at common law, both because the
new Act's interaction with the Code cannot be understood without
reference to such doctrines, and because these doctrines are often
likely to be of continued applicability under the new Act. It will
then examine the seller's rights under the U.C.C., and will discuss
his relations with certain bankruptcy-relevant Code third parties.
Following this, the Article will examine the seller-trustee clash as
it developed under the prior Bankruptcy Act. Finally, it will assess
the position of the seller under the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and Defrauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to Conform to the Kravitz Case, 67 CoM. L.J. 86 (1962); Henson, Reclamation
Rights of Sellers Under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41 (1975); Kennedy, The Interest of A
Reclaiming Seller under Article 2 of the Code, 30 Bus. LAW. 833 (1975); King, Voidable
Preferences and the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 925 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as King, Voidable Preferences]; King, Reclamation Petition Granted: In Defense of the
Defrauded Seller, 44 REF. J. 81 (1970) [hereinafter cited as King, Reclamation Petition];
Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Act: A Roadmap of the
Strategies, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 609 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mann & Phillips,
The Reclaiming Seller]; Mann & Phillips, In re Federal's Inc., Another Round in the Battle
Between the Reclaiming Credit Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 46 FORDHAM L. Rzv. 641
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Mann & Phillips, Federal's]; Sebert, The Seller's Right to
Reclaim: Another Conflict Between the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act?
52 N.D. LAW. 219 (1976); Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 40 REF. J. 37 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Shanker, Bankruptcy]; Shanker, A Reply to
the Proposed Amendment of U. C. C. Section 2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights
vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 W. RES. L. Rv. 93 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Shanker, Reply]; Weintraub & Edelman, Seller's Right to Reclaim Property Under Section
2-702(2) of the Code Under the Bankruptcy Act: Fact or Fancy, 32 Bus. LAW. 1165 (1977);
Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Right to Recover
the Goods Upon Insolvency, 79 HARv. L. REv. 598 (1966). See generally R. DUESENBERG & L.
KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13.03[4] (1966);
R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § § 167-69 (1970); T.QUINN, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE COMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST T 2-403 (1978); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HAND3OOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-15 (1972); see also 3, 3A, 4, & 4A COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
For articles on the cash seller, see e.g., Dugan, Cash-Sale Sellers Under Articles 2 and 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 330 (1976); Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming
Seller, supra, at 642-47; Mann & Phillips, The Cash Seller Under the Uniform Commercial
Code,'20 B.C. L. REV. 370 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Mann & Phillips, Cash Sale]; Mann
& Phillips, The "Bad Check" Seller Under UCC Section 2-511(3), 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 329 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Mann & Phillips, Bad Check]; Wiseman, Cash Sellers, Secured Finan-
cers and the Meat Industry: An Analysis of Articles Two and Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 19 B.C. L. REV. 101 (1977). See also R. NORDSTROM, supra, §§ 166, 168-69; T. QUINN,
supra, 2-283 to 2-290, 2-309 to 2-313.
3. Throughout this Article the term "reclaiming seller" will be used generally to refer
to both the cash and the credit sellers.
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I. THE CREDIT SELLER AND THE CASH SELLER AT COMMON LAW
A. Seller-Buyer Relations
(1) The Credit Seller
In the typical credit sale, where title ordinarily passed at the
time of making the sale contract,' the usual pre-Code remedy of an
unpaid seller who had transferred possession of the goods was an
action for the price.5 When the seller was induced to enter the con-
tract and deliver the goods because of the buyer's fraud or misrepre-
sentation, however, the situation was different: the seller was able
to rescind the contract and retake the goods, the buyer being
deemed to have obtained only a voidable title. The parties were
restored to their precontractual position by an equitable operation
in which full title to the goods was viewed as never having passed
from the seller.' Basically, a sale induced by fraud or misrepresen-
tation was one involving a material misstatement of fact acted upon
by the other party to his detriment,' and the rescission remedy was
typically available whether the misstatement was intentional and
knowing, s negligent, or innocent.'
This Article is concerned with the defrauded credit seller who
conveys goods to an insolvent or nearly insolvent buyer who then
goes bankrupt. Subject to numerous state-by-state differences,' 0
there seem to have been at least two basic situations giving rise to
the seller's common-law right of rescission in this context-(1)
where the buyer received goods on credit not intending to pay for
them; and (2) where the buyer made material misstatements re-
garding his financial condition, thereby inducing the sale." In the
4. See L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 25, at 144-46 (2d ed. 1959).
5. See id. § 36, at 215; 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAw GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 561 (rev.
ed. 1948).
6. See L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 79, at 397-98; Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of
Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1059-60 (1954).
7. The factual misstatement requirement was often said to be satisfied only by a repre-
sentation as to a past or existing fact, and statements characterized as opinion, promise, or
prediction were not always regarded as fraudulent under this rule. See L. VOLD, supra note
4, § 79, at 399-400; 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, §§ 628-630. Silence, too, could sometimes
constitute a misstatement. Id. §§ 631-631a. In addition, the misstatement was required to
involve a material fact, id. § 627, and had to be both actually and justifiably relied upon, id.
§§ 633-34. Finally, such reliance had to be to the detriment of the party relying. Id. § 624.
8. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 624.
9. Id. § 632.
10. "Reference should be made to treatises on contracts and to the case law of the
jurisdiction in question . . . . [I]t should be remembered that the law of any particular
jurisdiction may vary from the general scheme here sketched in." 4A COLLIER, supra note 2,
70.41, at 484-86.
11. See O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1971); Manly v.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1
first case, fraud could be found even if the buyer were not insol-
vent.1" On the other hand, it was often said that a mere receipt of
the goods while insolvent, without anything more, would not consti-
tute fraud."3 There are, however, numerous cases that regarded the
buyer's receipt of goods while insolvent as probative of the intent
not to pay for them." In fact, the right to rescind often was avail-
able even when the insolvent buyer honestly intended to pay but
had no reasonable basis for assuming his ability to do so. 5
The second type of fraudulent purchase, in which the buyer
made material misstatements regarding his financial condition, dif-
fered from the first in at least three respects. First, proof of an actual
intent not to pay was sometimes held unnecessary. 6 Second,
negligent misstatements of financial condition or solvency could
give rise to the rescission right. 7 This differs from the first situation,
in which "[tihe true ground for rescission is the fraudulent intent,
of which hopeless insolvency is the sufficient and often the only
available evidence."' 8 Third, actual insolvency was not necessary in
this case. 9
(2) The Cash Seller
The common-law cash sale is one in which title to goods sold
Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1928). See also 3 WILLISTON, supra note 5, §§ 636,
637; Annot., 59 A.L.R. 418 (1929). For a schematization of common-law fraud somewhat
different from that presented here, see 4A COLLIER, supra note 2, % 70.41, at 486-87.
12. See 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 637, at 455-56. Here, the "misstatement" and
"past or existing fact" requirements, see note 7 supra, were handled by Williston as follows:
"It may be urged that a mere intention does not amount to a representation of an existing
fact by the buyer, but the purchase of goods implies a promise to pay for them even if there
is no express promise; and a promise to pay, whether express or implied, involves a represen-
tation that the buyer intends to keep his promise." Id. at 456-57 (footnote omitted). See also
id. § 630.
13. Id. § 637, at 457; Annot., supra note 11, at 424. For instance, a buyer who took the
goods with a good faith reasonable intent to pay was often regarded as not having defrauded
the seller. E.g., In re Empire Grocery Co., 277 F. 73 (D. Mass. 1921); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 51
(1952). See also Annot., supra note 11, at 426.
14. See, e.g., California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528, 530 (2d Cir. 1933);
In re Paper City Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115 (D. Mass. 1928); In re Henry Siegel Co., 223
F. 369, 370 (D. Mass. 1915); In re Spann, 183 F. 819, 822-23 (N.D. Ga. 1910). See also 4A
COLLIER, supra note 2, 70.41, at 489-90.
15. E.g., In re Gurvitz, 276 F. 931 (D. Mass. 1921); see 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, §
637, at 457; Annot., supra note 11, at 428-30.
16. See Annot., supra note 11, at 420.
17. See, e.g., Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1928). On negligent mis-
statements as a basis for misrepresentation see, e.g., 4A COLLIER, supra note 2, at 487, n.16.
18. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 637, at 457 (footnote omitted).
19. "The basis for rescission is falsity of the representation, not the presence of insol-
vency; it, therefore, is available in the absence of insolvency." 4A COLLIER, supra note 2,
70.41, at 487 n.15.
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was to pass from seller to buyer only upon the buyer's payment of
the price:"0 that is, when the seller delivers possession to the buyer
in the understanding that the price shall be paid at once and title
shall not pass until payment." This obviously distinguishes the cash
sale from the more general sale situation (exemplified by the credit
sale) in which title passed upon formation of the sale contract."
What exempted the cash sale from this general rule was the pres-
ence of an intention that title was to pass only upon payment.s3 The
most common instance of such an intention was the situation where
the seller parted with possession of the goods while accepting the
buyer's worthless check as payment." Similarly, where the sale
agreement expressly stipulated that title would pass only when the
price was paid, there usually was no difficulty in concluding the
existence of a cash sale." Two other situations almost universally
20. E.g., L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 29, at 160. The cash sale has also been defined as
involving the transfer of both title and possession upon payment of the price. E.g., 2 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 341. Most courts, however, treat as cash sales transactions in
which the seller transfers payment to the buyer in expectation of immediate payment: that
is, cases where delivery and payment are to be substantially simultaneous. See Vold,
Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous" and Conflicting Analogies, 1
HASTINGS J. 111, 111-12 (1950). This is an obvious concession to the near impossibility of an
exactly simultaneous exchange of possession and payment. See L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 29,
at 161. On the conflict between Vold and Williston, see also note 24 infra.
21. J. WArIr, THE LAW OF SALS 33-34 (1921).
22. See text accompanying note 4 supra. It is more difficult, however, to distinguish the
common-law cash sale from the pre-Code conditional sale. Conditional sale contracts usually
contained an express provision whereby the seller transferred possession to the buyer while
retaining title for himself. See J. WArrE, supra note 21, at 99-100; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note
5, § 341, at 325. Despite this definitional overlap, the cash sale and the conditional sale were
rather different in practice. In the most common form of conditional sale, the seller was not
regarded as transferring possession with an expectation of immediate payment, but rather
as having extended credit with respect to the possession of the goods, and as having employed
a security device allowing retention of title (and a consequent right of reclamation) until the
buyer-in-possession completed a series of installment payments. See id.; L. VOLD, supra note
4, § 57.
23. See 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 343, at 332. See also L. VOLD, supra note 4, §
29.
24. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 2, at 501; L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 30, at 169-71. This
was severely criticized by Williston, and this criticism provoked a counterattack by Vold.
Compare 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 346a with Vold, supra note 20. However, Williston
did admit that "so far as the cases on worthless checks are involved the author's analysis is
not supported by the weight of authority." 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 346B, at 346.
25. L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 169 (1931). However, at this point the cash
sale begins to take on some of the attributes of the conditional sale. See note 22 supra. Also,
the use of contract language like "terms cash" or "cash sale" sometimes was not regarded as
amounting to an express provision for a cash sale. L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 29, at 161-62; 2 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 343, at 335. In addition, "cash on delivery" sales have often been
held not to be cash sales. F. BURDICK, THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1913);
2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 345.
1980]
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regarded as cash sales were the "over-the-counter" sale2" and the
self-service store sale.27 In all such cases, the usual remedy available
to the seller who had transferred possession without receiving pay-
ment 8 was reclamation of the goods conveyed on the theory that
title to them still resided in the seller. 9 This reclamation right could
be waived, however, ordinarily by failure to object to nonpayment
or to attempt reclamation within a reasonable time."
B. Rights Against Third Parties
Despite the ability of the defrauded credit seller and the unpaid
cash seller to reclaim the goods he conveys to a nonpaying buyer,
both types of sellers occasionally encountered difficulty at common
law when third parties acquired interests in the goods after their
delivery to the buyer. For instance, the defrauded credit seller could
not repossess where a good faith purchaser for value acquired the
goods from the buyer.31 Similarly, despite a considerable and long-
standing disagreement regarding the relative rights of the cash seller
and such a good faith purchaser, the trend seems to have been in
favor of the purchaser.3 2 However, both cash and credit sellers
26. L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 29, at 160; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 343, at 333.
27. 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 343, at 333-34. For other instances found to be cash
sales, see F. BURDICK, supra note 25, at 60; R. NORDSTROM, supra note 2, at 501.
28. It should be noted that if there is too long a delay between transfer of the goods
and payment a transaction intended to be a cash sale may change into a credit sale. L. VOLD,
supra note 4, § 29, at 166-67.
29. J. WAITE, supra note 21, at 79; R. NoRDsTRoM, supra note 2, at 501 n.96.
30. L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 29, at 167-69. The case most often cited in this regard is
Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 A. 45 (1907) (21/2 month delay). See also Note, Right to
Reclaim Delivered Goods in a Cash Sale, 36 DICK. L. REv. 276 (1932). This situation obviously
overlaps somewhat with that described in note 28 supra.
31. See L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 79, at 400-02; 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 650;
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 1060. Since both the seller and the purchaser could be regarded as
equally innocent parties in this case, the purchaser's superior claim was often based on the
policy of promoting transferability of goods. See L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 79, at 401. Also, it
was sometimes held that the defrauded credit seller would lose to a secured party such as a
chattel mortgagee or a pledgee if such a party was able to qualify as a good faith purchaser
for value. See 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 23, at 618, § 307 (1939); 72 C.J.S. Pledges § 26
(1951). From all that has been said already, it should be clear that the nondefrauded credit
seller also lost to such good faith purchasers, since this seller transferred full title to the buyer,
and since the buyer was ordinarily regarded as capable of transferring such title as he re-
ceived.
32. This trend culminated in § 2-403 of the U.C.C. See text accompanying note 113
infra. For commentary on the pre-Code confusion, see Collins, Title to Goods Paid for with
Worthless Check, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 340 (1942); Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and
the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 VAND. L. Rav. 55 (1966); Gilmore, supra note 6, at 1060-62; Vold,
supra note 20; Note, The "Cash Sale" Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrinal and Policy
Anomaly, 62 YALE L.J. 101 (1952); 3 HASTINGS J. 162 (1951); 42 MICH. L. REV. 328 (1943).
Also, if the chattel mortgagee or pledgee could qualify as a good faith purchaser for value,
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usually defeated an attaching lien creditor33 of the buyer,34 although
in the case of the defrauded credit seller there was a minority view
which permitted thle lien creditor to succeed. 5 Most importantly
here, both the defrauded credit seller3. and the cash seller" were able
to defeat the claim of a bankruptcy trustee administrating the es-
tate of an insolvent buyer who had entered bankruptcy after receiv-
ing the goods. Finally, it seems to have been suggested by some
such a secured party could sometimes defeat the cash seller. See 72 C.J.S. Pledges § 26 (1951).
In addition, there seems to be some authority for the proposition that the cash seller could
defeat such common-law secured parties because the failure of title to pass to the buyer
precluded the existence of the pledgor or chattel mortgagor property rights necessary for the
existence of a security interest. See Ison v. Cofield, 261 Ala. 296, 74 So. 2d 484 (1954); Franklin
Bank v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., 83 Ind. App. 94, 147 N.E. 722 (Ct. App. 1925); 17 MINN. L.
REV. 105 (1932); 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 305 (1939).
33. Throughout this article, the term "lien creditor" will be employed in accordance
with the U.C.C. definition contained in § 9-301(3); that is, as a party acquiring by attach-
ment, levy or the like. This definition seems to exclude consensual interests such as those
created by pledge, chattel mortgage arrangements, or otherwise under Article 9 of the Code.
34. As for the cash seller, see L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 30, at 170-71; Note, supra note
30, at 284-85; 16 MICH. L. REV. 557 (1918). As for the defrauded credit seller, see, e.g., L. VOLD,
supra note 4, § 79, at 402-03. In both cases, the basic rationale for seller recovery seemed to
be that, since the seller never transferred full title to the buyer, the lien creditor effectively
had nothing to attach. A different result presumably would have obtained in the case of the
nondefrauded credit seller who did transfer title to his buyer.
35. Such cases appear to have proceeded on the theory that an attaching creditor who
extended credit to the buyer after the transfer of the goods to him was to be treated like a
good faith purchaser for value, who would be able to defeat the seller. See, e.g., Schwartz v.
McCloskey, 156 Pa. 258, 263-64, 27 A. 300, 301-02 (1893); Smith v. Smith, Murphy & Co., 21
Pa. 367, 373 (1853); Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280, 285 (1901). This argument seems
to rest on the buyer's apparent absolute ownership of the goods and the creditor's consequent
right to rely on his possession of them as evidencing ownership. See Schwartz v. McCloskey,
156 Pa. 258, 263-64, 27 A. 300, 301-02 (1893). However, as the preceding note states, the nearly
unanimous common-law view was that the lien creditor should not be given good faith pur-
chaser status and should not defeat the defrauded seller. See J. BENJAMIN, LAW OF SALES OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY 477-78 (7th Am. ed. 1899); F. BURDICK, supra note 25, at 205; 2 F.
MECHEM, THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 924 (1901); F. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF SALES § 56, at 194 (2d ed. 1908). The reason for this view was that the attaching
creditor gave no new value for his taking and therefore could not qualify as a good faith
purchaser for value. Thus, the attaching creditor lost to the defrauded credit seller because
of the buyer's inability to acquire full title.
36. See, e.g., Jones v. H.M. Hobbie Grocery Co., 246 F. 431 (5th Cir. 1917) (seller
prevails under provision giving trustee rights of a lien creditor); Fisher v. Shreve, Crump &
Low Co., 7 F.2d 159 (D. Mass. 1925) (repossession not voidable preference). See generally 3
COLLIER, supra note 2, 60.18; 4A id., 70.41, at 485; L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 79, at 403.
See also Annot., supra note 11. However, in the ordinary, nonfraud credit sale situation a
recovery by the seller has been held a voidable preference. See Marks v. Goodyear Rubber
Sundries, Inc., 238 F.2d 533, 534 (2d Cir. 1956); Plummer v. Myers, 137 F. 660 (E. D. Pa.
1905). This presumably reflects the fact that in such a sale the seller transferred full title to
the buyer, a title which the trustee was able to assume.
37. See L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 30, at 171. This was presumably based on the fact that,
no title moving to the nonpaying buyer in a cash sale, the trustee had no right to the goods,
which remained the seller's property.
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authorities that "fraud" priority rules should apply where a bad
check sale was induced by the buyer's fraudulent behavior,38 but the
preferred view has been that the presence or absence of fraud did
not limit that seller's somewhat greater powers to recover from third
parties."5
II. THE RECLAIMING SELLER UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Seller-Buyer Relations
(1) The Credit Seller
Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,40 the credit
seller who has delivered goods but has not received payment, has,
like his common-law counterpart,41 an action for their price.4" The
seller can also recover the specific goods sold under U.C.C. section
2-702(2), which provides:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days
after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the
particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day
limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may
not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misre-
presentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
Section 2-702(2) is generally43 regarded as a qualified re-enactment
38. See, e.g., 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 346a, at 344-45. In fact, Williston might
be read as suggesting that the "bad check" situation is inherently fraudulent. This would lead
to the view that the defrauding buyer in a cash sale would have taken voidable title or
something like it, with lessened chances of recovery against the good faith purchaser and the
lien creditor, and perhaps against pre-Code secured parties. See notes 31-32, 34-35 supra and
accompanying text.
39. See Gilmore, supra note 6, at 1060.
Cash sale theory developed quite differently [than did credit sale theory]. A rea-
sonable man might suppose that if taking goods on credit without the intention or ability
to pay for them is fraud, then the same practice where the buyer is supposed to pay cash
would be the same kind of fraud. The courts have held, however, in the cash sale
situation that something more serious than "mere" fraud is involved, something ap-
proaching theft-"larceny by trick or device" as the time-honored phrase runs-and that
consequently the defaulting cash sale buyer gets no title, and can transfer none to a good
faith purchaser.
Id.
Also, accepting the idea that in a "cash sale-fraud" case the buyer gets voidable title
and the somewhat greater ability to transfer full title with which this seems to be associated
creates an anomalous situation in which the cash seller who was not defrauded would have
greater rights against third parties than one who was.
40. The U.C.C. basically applies to sales of goods. U.C.C. § 2-102. Its rules generally
supersede analogous common-law rules. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
41. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
42. See U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-709. The seller may also be able to recover incidental dam-
ages. See U.C.C. §§ 2-709, 2-710.
43. See, e.g., T. QUINN, supra note 2, at 2-405 to 2-406.
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of the common-law remedy of rescission for fraud.44 For instance,
Comment 2 to the section states that "[slubsection (2) takes as its
base line the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit by an
insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of
solvency and therefore is fraudulent as against the particular
seller. 45 Its "misrepresentation of solvency in writing within three
months before delivery" language similarly appears to be rooted in
common-law fraud." Finally, the last sentence of section 2-702(2)
seems to block any recourse to pre-Code rules by the seller.4"
In order to make use of the 2-702(2) reclamation right, the seller
must meet a number of technical requirements imposed by the sec-
tion and by judicial interpretations of it. First, the seller must dis-
cover that the buyer had received the goods while insolvent. An
insolvent party is defined by the Code as one "who either has ceased
to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his
debts as they become due or is insolvent within the meaning of the
federal bankruptcy law."4 Second, the seller must demand the
goods within ten days of their receipt by the buyer unless there is a
written misrepresentation of solvency within three months of deliv-
ery. This ten day period has been held to run from the day after the
goods have been received until the tenth day after such receipt. 9 It
appears that actual physical repossession of the goods within the ten
day period is not required,5 but there is disagreement as to what
minimum action must be taken by the seller. One case has sug-
gested that "an act of demanding or asking" 51 may be enough. An-
other case appears to have considered a telephone call to be suffi-
cient. Some decisions, however, have treated a bare oral demand
as unsatisfactory, and have required some sort of "follow-up" in
44. See notes 6-19 supra and accompanying text.
45. This seems to codify the common-law rule that receipt of goods while insolvent
could prove intent to defraud. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text. However, the
Comment says that such a receipt of goods is instead a tacit business misrepresentation of
solvency, thus suggesting reference to the second branch of the common-law fraud remedy.
See notes 11, 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
46. This seems clearly to relate to the second branch of the common-law fraud remedy.
See notes 11, 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
47. For situations in which this assertion may not be true, see notes 258-63, 294 infra
and accompanying text.
48. U.C.C. § 1-201(23).
49. In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd, 445
F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
50. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-15, at 242.
51. In re Childress, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 505, 507 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (dictum quoting
Webster's dictionary as to the meaning of the term "demand").
52. Metropolitan Distribs. v. Eastern Supply Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 128, 134 (Ct. C.P.
Allegheny County 1959) (dictum).
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addition to the demand.53 It is uncertain exactly what this in-
volves,-" but one case has implied that a reclamation petition in
bankruptcy, even if entered more than ten days after receipt of the
goods, may be sufficient to satisfy this requirement. 5
Section 2-702 provides that the ten day demand limitation has
no application "if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to
the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery."
Comment 2 to section 2-702 states that in order for this exception
to come into effect "the statement of solvency must be in writing,
addressed to the particular seller and dated within three months of
the delivery." However, the "dating" requirement has been ignored
by one case which held that the writing need only have been
presented to the seller within three months of the delivery." Courts
have also held a signed purchase order" and a letter virtually admit-
ting insolvency while setting out a schedule of payments5 8 not to be
"writings." A check, on the other hand, has often been treated as
meeting this requirement.59 Despite their absence in the language of
section 2-702(2), courts have grafted common-law fraud require-
ments" onto that section in "written misrepresentation" cases by
holding that the seller must have relied upon the writing and must
have been acting with the prudence of an ordinary businessman in
53. In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1974); In re
Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1968), affl'd, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
54. In In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1974), the court
inferred that this meant "a regaining of possession or a bona fide attempt to do so." In In re
Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1968), affl'd, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), the referee stated:
I am not prepared to say that the actual regaining of possession of the goods is required
to constitute the exercise of a right of reclamation, but it seems to me that something
more is required than a bare oral demand, which is not followed up by any type of legal
action or effort to regain peaceable repossession without legal action.
The referee in Behring did not discuss the derivation of the "follow-up" requirement. Ob-
viously, § 2-702 does not contain any language that would support the requirement. However,
it is conceivable that the requirement is derived from Comment 3 to § 2-507. See notes 81-83
infra and accompanying text. The Colacci's case, it might be noted, involved both § 2-702(2)
and § 2-507(2), and probably derived this requirement from the latter.
55. See In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1968),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
56. In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 1971).
57. See In re Regency Furniture, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1381 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
58. See In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46 (D. Conn. 1965).
59. See, e.g., In re Creative Bldgs. Inc., 498 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974); Amoco Pipeline Co.
v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114, 117 (10th Cir. 1974); In re Bar-Wood, Inc., 15
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
96, 107-08 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 103 Ill.
App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1968).
60. See note 7 supra.
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so relying." Finally, courts have explicitly stated that the Code's
requirement of good faith applies to the seller in this situation.
6 2
(2) The Cash Seller
In situations involving the sale of goods, 3 the common-law
"cash sale" doctrines discussed above "4 would not, of course, be
applicable if they conflicted with U.C.C. provisions on this subject.1
5
Although there are no Code sections specifically identified as "cash
sale" provisions6" and the Code strongly deemphasizes the concept
of "title" which was so crucial to the common-law "cash sale doc-
trine," 7 two U.C.C. provisions-sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)-are
obvious Code counterparts of this doctrine.
Section 2-507(2) of the U.C.C. provides that: "Where payment
is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or docu-
ments of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of
them is conditional upon his making the payment due." Like the
common-law cash sale, this section envisions a situation in which a
nearly simultaneous exchange of goods and payment is intended.
Moreover, making the buyer's rights against the seller conditional
on payment states a rule functionally equivalent to the common-law
transfer of title only upon payment." The relevant portion of section
2-511(3) states that "payment by check is conditional and is de-
feated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due pre-
sentment." 9 Although, unlike section 2-507(2), this section fails
explicitly to describe the status of goods conveyed to the buyer in
a "bad check" transaction, it is difficult to see how the buyer could
have the right to retain the goods if his payment by check is
"conditional" and "defeated . . . by dishonor."
Despite occasional statements to the effect that the common-
law "cash sale" doctrine is of little or no importance under the
61. See In re Creative Bldgs. Inc., 498 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator
Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 107-08 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. First
Trust & Say. Bank, 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1968).
62. See, e.g., In re Creative Bldgs. Inc., 498 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974); Theo. Hamm
Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911 (1968).
63. See U.C.C. § 2-102.
64. See notes 20-30 supra and accompanying text.
65. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
66. But see note 113 infra.
67. See U.C.C. § 2-401.
68. Section 2-507(2) is routinely regarded by commentators as a "cash sale" provision.
See, e.g., R. NORDSTROM, supra note 2, at 501.
69. Also, Comment 4 to § 2-511(3) states that: "This Article recognizes that the taking
of a seemingly solvent party's check is commercially normal and proper and, if due diligence
is exercised in collection, is not to be penalized in any way."
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U.C.C., 7° the Code cases arising under sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)
display many of the incidents of, and doctrines surrounding, their
common-law counterparts. First, like many common-law cash sale
decisions, almost all of the Code litigation involves "bad check"
cases. 7' Most of these "bad check" decisions do not proceed under
section 2-511(3) alone,72 but rather under both section 2-507(2) and
section 2-511(3), 73 or even solely under section 2-507(2). 7" Second,
decisions under both sections explicitly recognize a right of reclama-
tion in the unpaid seller, and in doing so basically seem to reaffirm
the reclamation right accorded the cash seller at common law.7
However, since neither section 2-507(2) nor section 2-511(3) con-
tains an explicit reclamation provision, there has been some disa-
greement regarding the source of this right. Some 2-507(2) deci-
sions 76 have established the power to reclaim through an effective
grafting of the reclamation right contained in U.C.C. section 2-
702(2) 71 onto section 2-507(2). 78 Other 2-507(2) cases, however, have
not adopted this approach, but seem to regard the ability to reclaim
as more or less inherent to the section.7 9 Similarly, most of the
70. See, e.g., Gross v. Powell, 288 Minn. 386, 391-92, 181 N.W.2d 113, 117-18 (1970);
Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgenson, 245 Or. 362, 365-66, 421 P.2d 978, 980 (1966). See also U.C.C.
§ 2-401 & Comment 1. But see Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Or. 20, 444 P.2d
564, 571 (1970) (2-507(2) "represents whatever remains of the 'cash sale' doctrine under the
code.").
71. Only one U.C.C. cash sale case has not involved payment by check. See Evans
Prods. Co. v. Jorgenson, 245 Or. 362, 421 P.2d 978 (1966). Cf. First National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Jim Payne Pontiac GMC, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 768 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (sight
draft).
72. For "bad check" cases which do proceed solely under § 2-511(3), see, e.g., In re Bar-
Wood, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Gicinto v. Credithrift of America, 219 Kan.
766, 549 P.2d 870 (1976). See also Mann & Phillips, Bad Check, supra note 2, at 343-51.
73. See, e.g., In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1964); In re
Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1974).
75. On the pre-Code reclamation right granted the unpaid cash seller, see text accom-
panying note 29 supra.
76. See In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 938, 941 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (dictum);
In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384 (N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Kirk Kabi-
nets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746, 748-49 (M.D. Ga. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 106-07 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Greater Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle
Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Ky. 1965). See also United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank,
505 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that § 2-507(2) should not apply where the rights of
third parties are involved, and seeming to regard § 2-702(2) as the appropriate provision in
such cases); B & P Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 147 Ga. App. 762, 250 S.E.2d 505 (1978)
(2-507(2) and 2-702(2) do not govern recoveries against third parties). For a discussion of this,
see note 112 infra.
77. See the text following note 42 supra.
78. This is to some degree based upon Comment 3 to section 2-507. See the text accom-
panying note 81 infra.
79. See In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968); In re Mort
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section 2-511(3) decisions that affirm such a right do so without
reference to section 2-702(2), again appearing to regard the reclama-
tion right as inherent to the operation of section 2-511(3). 8o
Whatever applicability section 2-702(2) has also pervades case
law elaborations of the procedural requirements for the operation of
the 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) reclamation rights. Comment 3 to section
2-507 continues and supplements pre-Code waiver-by-delay doc-
trines" when it states that:
Should the seller after making such a conditional delivery fail to follow up his
rights, the condition is waived. The provision of this Article for a ten day limit
within which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent
buyer is also applicable here.
Thus, two separate (but hardly distinct)12 waiver requirements seem
applicable under this section-first, a requirement that the seller
"follow up" his rights or waive the condition under which the buyer
may retain or dispose of the goods; 3 and second, the "ten day de-
mand" requirement of section 2-702(2).11 Also, at least one court85
has found section 2-702(2)'s "written misrepresentation" option"8 to
the ten day demand requirement applicable in the 2-507(2) con-
text. 7 As for reclamations proceeding solely under section 2-511(3),
most of the relevant cases simply do not discuss 2-702(2) "demand"
Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See also In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Peck v. Augustin, 279 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Neb. 1979) (replevin
statute used by a 2-507(2)/2-111(3) seller; 2-702 not mentioned).
80. See Gicinto v. Credithrift of America, 219 Kan. 766, 770, 549 P.2d 870, 873 (1976);
Conyngham & Co. v. Frank, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 762, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 83 (Ct. C.P. Luzerne
County 1975). But see In re Bar-Wood, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828, 829 (S.D. Fla. 1974)
(recognizing an inherent right of reclamation in § 2-511(3), but stating that this section only
operates as between the parties, and suggesting that § 2-702(2) must be utilized in third-party
cases). For further discussion of this, see note 112 infra.
81. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
82. The one decision discussing both of these requirements manages to blur them fairly
effectively. See In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1974).
83. The one case discussing this requirement has regarded it as necessitating "a regain-
ing of possession or a bona fide attempt to do so." In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d
1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1974). See also notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
84. See In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Helms Veneer
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968); In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746,
748-49 (M.D. Ga. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 106-07 (S.D.
Iowa 1973). On the details of this requirement in the 2-702(2) context, see notes 49-52 supra
and accompanying text.
85. See In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 106-08 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
86. See notes 56-62 supra and accompanying text.
87. Although the close linkage of the "ten day demand" and "written misrepresen-
tation" aspects of section 2-702(2) creates some justification for this application of 2-702(2)
requirements to 2-507(2), it clearly goes beyond the express command of Comment 3, and,
moreover, tends to mix "fraud" and "cash sale" rationales to an undesirable degree.
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or "written misrepresentation" requirements.8
These cases, notwithstanding, any extension of section 2-702(2)
in the cash sale context beyond Comment 3's explicit imposition of
the ten day demand requirement is improper and unwarranted.
Thus, the reclamation right granted the unpaid section 2-507(2)/2-
511(3) seller should be viewed as inherent to these sections. One
reason for this conclusion is the difficulty of finding an express
statutory link between these two sections and section 2-702(2).
While Comment 2 to section 2-507 does provide some connection
with section 2-702(2), to limit, as it does, the unpaid 2-507(2) seller's
reclamation right is certainly not to create such a right in the first
place. More importantly, the "follow-up" limitation of Comment 3,
which is in no way linked to section 2-702 but is similar to common-
law waiver doctrines, clearly implies the preexistence of a reclama-
tion right, while its conjunction with section 2-507 strongly suggests
that the right somehow inheres in the language of section 2-507(2).
The difficulty of conjoining sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) with
section 2-702(2) is compounded by a consideration of the historical
antecedents of these provisions. As has been argued at some length,
sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) are obviously rooted in and related
to the common-law doctrines surrounding the "cash sale."90 Section
2-702(2), on the other hand, is clearly prefigured by the common-
law remedy of rescission for fraud.91 As has been suggested above,
these two situations were analytically distinct at common law, and
sometimes led to different results in cases in which third parties
were involved. 2 Finally, it ought to be noted that U.C.C. section 1-
10313 should provide a more than adequate statutory basis for allow-
ing the common-law cash sale reclamation right to accompany sec-
tions 2-507(2) and 2-511(3).
88. Presumably, common-law waiver requirements, or something like them, would
apply in this situation. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. One decision, however, has
held both 2-702(2) requirements applicable in what may be a 2-511(3) context. See In re Bar-
Wood, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1974). In this case, the judge stated that 2-
511(3) would apply as between the parties in a bad check case, but seemed to feel that it
could provide no reclamation right in a "third party" situation, and went on to utilize § 2-
702(2). In the application of this section, he concluded that there had been no demand by
the seller within the ten day period, and also that the buyer's check did not (on these facts)
constitute a written misrepresentation of solvency. See also note 112 infra.
89. This problem is especially severe in the case of § 2-511(3), whose only conceivable
link to § 2-702(2) is the statement in its Comment 6 to the effect that post-dated check sales
are to be governed by § 2-702(2).
90. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 6-9, 20-23, 31-37 supra and accompanying text.
93. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides that: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity . ..shall supplement its provisions."
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Even if this limitation of section 2-702(2)'s applicability to cash
sale cases is accepted, the practical position of the most common
type of cash seller-the seller who receives a bad check in pay-
ment-is still perilous, because the seller often will not even dis-
cover the buyer's failure to pay within ten days. At bottom, the
choice of a ten day limitation reflects an ignorance of modern bank-
ing parties. 4 One way to resolve this problem without unduly dis-
turbing the case law linking 2-702(2)'s ten day demand requirement
to section 2-507(2) s and the command of that section's Comment 3
is, as has been argued elsewhere, 6 to make section 2-511(3) alone
the applicable "cash sale" provision in bad check cases, and to leave
for section 2-507(2) the residual cash sale categories. 7 This statutory
allocation would make the ten day limitation of 2-702(2) inapplica-
ble to bad check cases, since there is virtually nothing" to link this
requirement to section 2-511(3). The conclusion that section 2-
511(3) alone should govern bad check situations flies in the face of
much existing case law," but it is an eminently rational division of
responsibility between sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3). First, the lan-
guage of the two sections clearly suggests this result.' 0 Second, some
decisions have taken just this approach.10' Third, the language of
U.C.C. section 2-403(1) strongly implies this conclusion by explic-
itly distinguishing the two cash sale situations. 2 If this approach
is followed and the seller is given adequate time to discover the
buyer's non-payment and to take appropriate action, the seller still
will not be able to delay unduly in doing so. Section 2-511(3) ex-
94. As one commentator has put it:
a ten-day period for reclaiming under section 2-507(2) may be unduly short in situations
in which a check has been returned for insufficient funds. Such a check may have passed
through several indorsers and banks, not being returned to the seller until after the buyer
has had the goods for more than ten days. A seller who has negotiated or transferred a
check in the ordinary course of his business ought not be held to have waived his
demanded payment solely because the banking process requires more than ten days to
inform the seller that the check was dishonored.
R. NORDSTROM, supra note 2, at 503.
95. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
96. See Mann & Phillips, Bad Check, supra note 2, at 349.
97. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
98. The only reference to § 2-702(2) in § 2-511(3) and the Comments to § 2-511 is
Comment 6's reference to situations in which a credit instrument is post-dated.
99. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text. Also, the last sentence of Comment
6 to § 2-511, which seems to link §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) for bad check cases, is almost
certainly limited to post-dated check situations where the dispute is between the two parties
to the sale.
101. See note 72 supra.
102. See note 113 infra.
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pressly requires "due presentment,"'' 3 and the seller who is thus
notified of the buyer's failure to pay should be subject to pre-Code
waiver doctrines'04 incorporated by U.C.C. section 1-103.
B. Third Party Rules
As was the case at common law,' 5 the seller's ability to reclaim
goods may be affected by the rights of third parties with interests
in them. Third parties will generally fall into one of three groups:' 6
good faith purchasers, those with an Article 9 security interest, and
attaching lien creditors. This subsection will explore the reclaiming
Code seller's rights against each type of third party. This discussion
will have numerous implications for the subsequent examination of
the seller's rights when the buyer has entered bankruptcy.
(1) Good Faith Purchaser
The unpaid seller's right to reclaim the goods will be termi-
nated if the buyer transfers the goods to a good faith purchaser for
value. In the credit sale situation this subordination occurs either
directly by section 2-702(3) or indirectly by section 2-403(1). Section
2-702(3) states that "[t]he seller's right to reclaim under subsec-
tion (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other
good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403). '" ' 7 One in-
terpretation of this subsection is that it directly subordinates the
seller to a good faith purchaser.' 8 The other view is that it simply
subjects the seller to the "rights," whatever they may be, of a good
faith purchaser and refers to section 2-403 for the determination of
what those rights are.' 0 Section 2-403(1) provides in relevant part
that "[a] person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value.""10 Given the strong re-
semblance of the section 2-702(2) reclamation right to the common-
law remedy of rescission for fraud,"' it is plausible to conclude that
the credit seller's immediate buyer has received voidable title and
that section 2-403(1) therefore operates to cut off the right of recla-
103. Presumably, U.C.C. § 3-503 will govern here.
104. On these, see note 30 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 20-30 supra and accompanying text.
106. It should be noted that these three types of third parties are not necessarily mu-
tually exclusive. For example, it will be seen that holders of Article 9 security interests may
be deemed purchasers for value. See notes 116-23 infra and accompanying text.
107. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1972 version).
108. Cf. notes 157-58 infra and accompanying text.
109. Cf. notes 152-53 infra and accompanying text..
110. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). For the relevant text of this section, see note 113 infra.
111. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
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mation in favor of a good faith purchaser for value.
Neither of the cash sale sections purports to address the ques-
tion of third party priorities," 2 but Comment 3 to section 2-507
refers to section 2-403 for resolution of this problem."' Section 2-
403(1) enables a buyer of goods to transfer good title to a good faith
purchaser for value in the two cash sale situations discussed
above."' The first, addressed by section 2-403(1)(b), is the situation
in which delivery is in exchange for a check which is later disho-
nored. The second, covered by section 2-403(1)(c), is the situation
in which the parties agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash
sale." These two factual settings together comprise all of the cash
sale cases, thus precluding an unpaid cash seller from recovering the
goods from a good faith purchaser for value. There have been few
reported opinions involving those who take other than by lien or
security interest, but all of these permitted the cash seller to recover
because of the failure of the purchaser to establish his "good faith
for value" status. "5 However, it is clear that once a third party
112. U.C.C. § 2-507(2) states: "Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery
to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose
of them is conditional upon his making the payment due" (emphasis added). U.C.C. § 2-
511(3) provides in relevant part: "payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between
the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment" (emphasis added). This failure of
§§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) to deal with third-party situations has been noted by various courts;
this failure has sometimes led them to conclude that § 2-702(3) has a role to play in this
regard. See notes 76, 80, 88 supra. For a view that § 2-702(3) should not serve this function,
see notes 160-63, 165 infra and accompanying text. In fact, § 2-403, alone should govern cash
sale priorities. For a more detailed treatment of this view, see Mann & Phillips, Cash Sale,
supra note 2, at 385-95.
113. U.C.C. § 2-403 provides in relevant part that
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title
to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction
of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be "cash sale" . . . .
U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3 states in relevant part: "Subsection (2) deals with the effect of a
conditional delivery by the seller and in such a situation makes the buyer's 'right as against
the seller' conditional upon payment. These words are used as words of limitation to conform
with the policy set forth in the bona fide purchase sections of this Article."
114. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text. Much the same result would obtain
if § 2-702(2) were the source of the cash sale reclamation right. See notes 107-111 supra and
accompanying text.
115. Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313, 316, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1337, 1343 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (subsequent purchaser had notice of unpaid cash
seller's § 2-507 claim); Conyngham & Co. v. Frank, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 762, 20 U.C.C. Rap.
Serv. 83 (Ct. C.P. Luzerne Co. 1975) (sub-purchaser did not contract or pay for goods after
delivery to buyer.) The court in the second case reached this result despite the fact that
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proves that he is a good faith purchaser for value, he will inevitably
prevail over the cash seller.
(2) Article 9 Secured Party
(a) Perfected Security Interest
If an unpaid reclaiming seller"' attempts to reclaim the goods
from his buyer he may discover that another type of third party has
terminated his right to them-a creditor of the buyer with a per-
fected Article 9 security interest in the goods,117 whose priority re-
sults from the Code's broad definitions of "purchase" and
"purchaser."'" 8 Moreover, since the definition of "value" under the
Code includes security for a pre-existing claim,"' a secured party
with an after-acquired property clause would be considered a pur-
chaser for value.'2 0 Thus, so long as the secured party acts in good
faith'' he will be deemed a good faith purchaser for value, and
therefore immune from the reclamation claims of an unpaid re-
claiming seller.'1
2
U.C.C. § 1-201(44) defines "value" to include accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing
contract for purchase. For the definitions of "good faith," "purchaser," and "value" see
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), (32), (33), (44), 2-104(1). See also Gus Z. Lancaster's Stock Yards, Inc.
v. Williams, 37 N.C. App. 698, 246 S.E.2d 823 (1978) (alleged good faith seller actually agent
of buyer for resale of goods).
116. Since this portion of the Article is concerned primarily with the secured party as
a good faith purchaser for value, its discussion should be equally applicable to §§ 2-702(2),
2-507(2), and 2-511(3). See notes 107-15 supra and accompanying text.
117. For conclusions contrary to those developed in this subsection, see e.g., Wiseman,
supra note 2.
118. U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33) provide in part:
"Purchase" includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue
or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.
"Purchaser" means a person who takes by purchase.
119. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b).
120. See, e.g., In re Daley, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 433, 435 (D. Mass. 1975); In re
Haywood Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1107, 1111-12 (D. Mass. 1967); Stumbo v. Paul
B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Or. 20, 41-43, 444 P.2d 564, 574-75 (1968).
121. For a case in which the secured party did not show good faith, see In re American
Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 436, 441-44 (N.D. Ga. 1974). The various opinions
in In re Samuels & Co., 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Mahon v. Stowers, 416
U.S. 100 (1974), modified, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd en banc, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), provide contrasting views of what constitutes
"good faith" in the cash seller versus secured party situation.
122. In the credit sale instance, see, e.g., In re Daley, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 433,
435 (D. Mass. 1975). See also B & P Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 147 Ga. App. 762, 250
S.E.2d 505 (1978). In the cash sale instance, see, e.g., In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238,
1242-44 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th
Cir. 1974); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co, v. Jim Payne Pontiac GMC, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 768, 774-76 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Or. 20,
444 P.2d 564 (1968).
THE RECLAIMING SELLER
(b) Unperfected Security Interest
An unpaid cash seller who attempts to recover goods delivered
to the buyer may also be frustrated if an unperfected security inter-
est has been acquired in the goods. Since the Code does not distin-
guish between unperfected and perfected security interests with re-
spect to the requirements of purchase, value, and good faith, the
holder of an unperfected security interest should be a good faith
purchaser for value who should take free of the claims of an unpaid
reclaiming seller.'13 That a party with an unperfected security inter-
est also should prevail over a reclaiming seller if a perfected security
interest is entitled to do so comports with good policy, for the filing
or possession required for perfection is designed to protect parties
who might rely upon the debtor-buyer's possession of the goods. A
reclaiming seller, on the other hand, in no way needs such protec-
tion.
(3) Lien Creditor
The relative priorities of a reclaiming seller and a lien creditor'
24
were well established at common law: in most states the reclaiming
credit seller prevailed' 25 while the cash seller nearly always defeated
the lien creditor.2 6 The outcome under the U.C.C., however, is far
from clear. The discussion below will examine the judicial authority
that subordinates the reclaiming seller to a lien creditor. Cases sug-
gesting this conclusion do so on three different bases: (1) that a lien
123. One case, although taking a different tack on this priority question, has reached
this result by basing the superiority of the unperfected security interest on § 9-301 of the
Code. Guy Martin Buick, Inc., v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354
(1974). The court stated:
The declared policy of the Colorado Uniform Commercial Code requires that a security
agreement shall be effective between the parties and against other parties, except as is
specifically provided otherwise in the Code [U.C.C. § 9-201]. The priority provisions
of the Code delineate which interests in goods are superior to unperfected security
interests. [U.C.C. § 9-301]. The right to reclaim goods conveyed as part of a cash sale
transaction created by [U.C.C. § 2-507(2)], is not one of the interests which is listed as
having priority over an unperfected security interest. Therefore, the bank's unperfected
security interest, under the facts presented in this case, had priority over Guy Martin
Buick's right to reclaim the automobiles.
Id. at 175-76, 519 P.2d at 359-60. This reasoning should apply with equal force to a reclama-
tion right arising under § 2-702(2) or § 2-511(3) since neither is mentioned by § 9-301. Cf.
United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1974) (unclear
whether security interest perfected or not).
124. The Code's definition of a lien creditor is contained in § 9-301(3): "A 'lien creditor'
means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or
the like and includes . . . a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition
125. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
126. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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creditor is a good faith purchaser for value whose rights are superior
to the seller's under section 2-403(1); (2) classification of the recla-
mation right as an unperfected security interest which is subordi-
nate to the rights of a lien creditor under section 9-301(1)(b); and
(3) subordination of the reclaiming seller through the operation of
section 2-702(3). The details of these approaches for the credit seller
and the cash seller will be discussed in this order.
(a) Lien Creditor as Good Faith Purchaser
If a lien creditor were considered to be a good faith purchaser
for value, his rights would be superior to those of a reclaiming seller
by the operation of sections 2-702(3) and/or 2-403(1). 117 There ap-
pear to be only three cases discussing this possibility, one of which
clearly holds that a lien creditor is not a purchaser for value under
section 2-403, 158 and one of which states that a trustee in bankruptcy
is not a good faith purchaser but is a lien creditor.' The third case
may imply that a lien creditor could be considered a good faith
purchaser.""
It is analytically unsound, however, to consider a lien creditor
a good faith purchaser. First, section 2-403(1) states that a person
with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value, leaving the definition of such a party to section
1-201. But in subsection 2-403(4) the Code states: "The rights of
other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by the
Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Arti-
127. See notes 107-15 supra and accompanying text. For the text of § 2-403(1), see note
113 supra.
128. In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n v. Wear, 583 F.2d 992, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1978).
129. In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746, 749 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
130. In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976). The court stated:
The fact that the holder of a voluntary lien-including an Article Nine interest-is
a "purchaser" under the Code is of great significance to a proper understanding and
resolution of this case under Article Two and Article Nine. The Code establishes that
purchasers can take from a defaulting cash buyer, [section 2-403(1)]. Lien creditors are
included in the definition of purchasers, [sections 1-201(32), (33)]. A lien is an Article
Nine interest, [Comments to sections 9-101, 9-102]. The existence of an Article Nine
interest presupposes the debtor's having rights in the collateral sufficient to permit
attachment [section 9-204(1)]. Therefore, since a defaulting cash buyer has the power
to transfer a security interest to a lien creditor, including an Article Nine secured party,
the buyer's rights in the property, however marginal, must be sufficient to allow attach-
ment of a lien. And this is true, even if, arguendo, I were to agree that the cash seller is
granted reclamation rights under Article Two.
Id. at 1242-43 (emphasis in original). It is not especially clear whether this rather garbled
language intends, or should be taken to mean, that a lien creditor is a good faith purchaser.
But even if that meaning is given the quoted passage, its language would be no more than




cle 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7)." This language manifestly
implies that section 2-403(1) itself governs the rights of good faith
purchasers for value, whereas the rights of parties that are not good
faith purchasers for value (for example, lien creditors) are not gov-
erned by section 2-403. Second, lien creditors under the Code defini-
tion 3' are not holders of voluntary or consensual liens, and therefore
should not be included in the Code definition of "purchasers.'
32
Third, U.C.C. section 9-104 provides that "[t]his Article does not
apply . . .to a right represented by a judgment . . . ." Conse-
quently, Article 9 does not apply to judgment liens or judicial liens
such as "the lien of an unsecured creditor who arms himself with a
judgment and levies' '13 3-in brief, the lien possessed by a lien credi-
tor. Hence, it is clear that lien creditors are excluded from being
considered good faith purchasers for value by section 2-403.'13 For
these reasons, and because lien creditors do not rely upon the osten-
sible ownership or voidable title of the buyer,13 they should not be
granted good faith purchaser for value status and thereby acquire
rights superior to the reclamation right of the seller.
(b) Characterization of the Reclamation Right as a Security
Interest
If the seller's reclamation right were classified as an Article 2
security it would be subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor under
section 9-301(1)(b) of the Code.'13 This result can be avoided only
by the seller's perfecting his security interest."7 The Code itself
provides no clear answer regarding the classification of the seller's
reclamation right as a security interest, and while there is considera-
ble judicial authority to the effect that section 2-702(2) is not an
131. See notes 33 & 124 supra.
132. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32), (33) ("any other voluntary transaction creating an inter-
est in property").
133. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 758 n.14; see id. at 757-58.
134. Another argument can be made based upon the 1962 version of 2-702(3), which
states that the seller's right to reclaim under § 2-702(2) "is subject to the rights of a buyer in
ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-
403)." This clearly shows that the Code considers good faith purchasers and lien creditors to
be distinctly different parties.
135. See U.C.C. § 2-403, Comments 1, 3.
136. U.C.C. § 9-301(1) provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(2), an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of. . . (b) a person who
becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected."
137. By the terms of U.C.C. § 9-113 the holder of an Article 2 security interest need
not utilize Article 9 perfection procedures so long as he retains possession of the goods. If
possession is lost the holder must perfect according to Article 9 procedures. U.C.C. § 9-113,
Comment 3. This would basically involve obtaining a written security agreement signed by
the buyer, and perfecting by one of the methods specified in Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-302.
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Article 2 security interest,38 the scanty judicial authority with re-
gard to the cash sale is divided.'39
Analytically, neither the credit sale nor the cash sale reclama-
tion right should be characterized as a security interest. First, sec-
tions 2-702(2), 2-507(2), and 2-511(3) are not included in the listing
of Article 2 security interests contained in Comment 1'" to section
9-113.1'' Moreover, the seller's reclamation rights differ fundamen-
tally from many of the rights mentioned in that Comment: the very
operation of these rights contemplates and depends upon possession
of the goods by the holder of the Article 2 security interest. Also,
section 9-113 by its terms provides that an Article 2 security interest
is exempt from Article 9 perfection requirements as long as the
holder of the interest retains possession: that is, the interest is effec-
tively "perfected" while the holder retains possession. The reclama-
tion rights available under sections 2-702(c), 2-507(2), and 2-511(3),
however, cannot by the terms of these sections arise until after the
seller gives up possession to the buyer. Thus, these Code reclama-
tion rights are basically dissimilar to many of the Article 2 security
interests listed in Comment 1 to section 9-113, and they cannot be
exercised in a manner that entitles them to the section 9-113 exemp-
138. See, e.g., In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n v. Wear, 583 F.2d 992, 998-99 (8th Cir.
1978); In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968); In re American Food
Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 436, 440 (N.D. Ga. 1974); English v. Ralph Williams
Ford, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 437, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Ranchers & Farmers Livestock
Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1975).
139. Compare In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1245-48 (5th Cir. 1976) (§ 2-507(2)
reclamation right is a security interest) with Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs
Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354 (1974) (not a security interest). There have been no
cases dealing with the § 2-511(3) reclamation right as a security interest.
140. In relevant part, U.C.C. § 9-113, Comment 1 states that:
Under the provisions of Article 2 on Sales, a seller of goods may reserve a security
interest (see, e.g., Sections 2-401 and 2-505); and in certain circumstances, whether or
not a security interest is reserved, the seller has rights of resale and stoppage under
sections 2-703, 2-705 and 2-706 which are similar to the rights of a secured party. Simi-
larly, under such sections as sections 2-506, 2-707 and 2-711 a financing agency, an agent,
a buyer or another person may have a security interest or other right in goods similar to
that of a seller. The use of the term "security interest" in the Sales Article is meant to
bring the interests so designated within this Article. This section makes it clear, how-
ever, that such security interests are exempted from certain provisions of this Article.
141. U.C.C. § 9-113 provides in part:
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor
does not have or does not lawfully obtain the possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforcea-
ble; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by
the Article on Sales (Article 2).
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tion from the perfection requirement of Article 9. In short, these
Code sections do not create the sort of interest contemplated by
section 9-113. Second, even in the event that interests arising under
sections 2-702(2), 2-507(2), or 2-511(3) were deemed security inter-
ests, one might plausably argue that a defaulting buyer "does not
lawfully obtain possession of the goods" under section 9-113. If so,
the seller's rights under the "security interest" would be governed
solely by Article 2, and the arguments contained in this subsection
would not apply.'
(c) Subordination via Section 2-702(3)
The third basis for subordinating the reclaiming seller to the
lien creditor involves the 1962 version of section 2-702(3), which
states: "The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject
to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith pur-
chaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403)." As one
court has observed, "interpretation of this subsection has con-
founded courts and commentators-the only consensus to be found
is that there are numerous respectable, if somewhat unsatisfactory,
readings of the quoted language."''
The controversy regarding section 2-702(3)11 was touched off in
1960 when the Third Circuit issued its well-known decision in In re
Kravitz."5 In that case, the court did not directly subordinate the
2-702(2) seller to the lien creditor via 2-702(3), but undertook in-
stead a roundabout journey through section 2-403 to Article 9, at
which point it concluded that the Code did not resolve the credit
seller-lien creditor priority question, and thus resorted to pre-Code
Pennsylvania rules"' under which the lien creditor prevailed over
142. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 1290. Also, classifying the Code cash sale reclama-
tion right as a security interest is at odds with the nature of the underlying transaction. The
typical situation involving the retention of a security interest is a credit transaction where
the seller or the lender retains an interest in the goods as security for the price while the buyer
completes a series of installment payments. The typical cash sale, on the other hand, does
not contemplate an extension of credit, and the Code cash seller's reclamation right upon the
buyer's failure to pay is more like a power to undo the transaction than a recovery based on
the retention of title. This is true even when a check is accepted as payment, since acceptance
of a check (unless post-dated) does not change a cash sale into a credit transaction. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-511, Comment 6, R. NORDSTROM, supra note 2, at 502-03.
143. In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n v. Wear, 583 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1978).
144. For a more complete discussion of this matter, see Mann & Phillips, The Reclaim-
ing Seller, supra note 2, at 619-24. Almost all of the cases discussed below involve § 70(c) of
the Bankruptcy Act, which gives the trustee the status of an "ideal lien creditor." See notes
177-78 infra and accompanying text.
145. 278 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1960).
146. These rules constituted a distinctly minority position, the usual common-law view
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the seller."17 In reaction to Kravitz, the Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code amended section 2-702(3) by de-
leting its "or lien creditor" language in 1966.111 This amendment has
since been adopted by approximately one-third of the states."'
Taken in its historical context,'50 this amendment was almost cer-
tainly intended to assist the seller, and its most likely effect is to
compel resolution of the credit seller-lien creditor controversy under
the pre-Code rules that generally favor the seller.' 51
In states which still retain the 1962 version of section 2-702(3),
a variety of approaches to this problem has emerged. The first of
these, which has been adopted by three of the four circuit-level cases
decided to date,'52 utilizes reasoning similar to that found in Kravitz
to compel recourse to common law.'5 3 As has been suggested, this
being that the defrauded credit seller would defeat the lien creditor. See notes 34-35 supra
and accompanying text.
147. Kravitz involved the competing rights of the seller and the trustee to goods deliv-
ered on credit to the buyer three days before his involuntary petition in bankruptcy. One day
after the petition was filed the seller attempted to reclaim the goods under § 2-702(2). Both
the bankruptcy referee and district court rejected the seller's claim. In affirming this decision,
the Third Circuit did not interpret § 2-702(3) as directly subordinating a credit seller to a
lien creditor or a trustee. Instead, the court noted that § 2-702(3) refers to § 2-403 in defining
the relative rights of a seller and a lien creditor. The only reference in § 2-403 to lien creditors
is that "[tihe rights of. . . lien creditors are governed by the [Article] on Secured Transac-
tions (Article 9) .... " 278 F.2d at 821-22. The court then referred to § 9-301(3), which
regards a lien creditor as "a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition."
The court interpreted this section as recognizing that the rights of a trustee as lien creditor
are governed by the Bankruptcy Act. The Third Circuit then stated: "It is perfectly clear that,
while Section 70, sub. c of the Bankruptcy Act makes the trustee an ideal lien creditor, what
such a lien creditor gets is determined by the law of the state involved . . . ." Id. at 822.
However, in referring to state law, the court apparently did not regard the Code as dispositive
with respect to the rights of a lien creditor as against the reclaiming seller. Instead, it resorted
to pre-Code Pennsylvania law finding that the reclaiming seller, even if defrauded, could not
triumph over certain lien creditors. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. Then, after
holding that nothing in the U.C.C. changed this rule, it found for the trustee, affirming the
district court decision. It ought to be noted that Kravitz proceeded under a version of § 2-
702 slightly different from that quoted by the text following note 42 supra. See U.C.C. § 2-
702(1) (1952 version).
148. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report No. 3, at 3
(1967). This has been incorporated in U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1972 version).
149. For a more or less current listing, see UNIORM LAws ANNOTATED, Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 2-702, at 350 (1976). According to that listing, 16 states have adopted the new
language. It has been suggested that the original inclusion of the "or lien creditor" language
was simply a drafting error. See T. QuiNN, supra note 2, at 2-410 to -411.
150. See, e.g., Hawkland, supra note 2, at 88.
151. There appear to have been no seller-lien creditor cases brought under the 1972
version of § 2-702(3).
152. In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1977); In re Mel Golde Shoes,
Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1960). See
also In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 938 (E.D. Pa. 1977); In re Royalty Homes,
Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 61, 64 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
153. Actually, there seem to be three more or less distinguishable approaches here, all
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approach will usually favor the seller. The second approach, taken
by the remaining circuit court,'5 4 also favors the seller, but, unlike
the first, remains wholly within the confines of the U.C.C. The
decision appears to be based upon the "revealed intent" of the
Code. On this view, the reference to the rights of lien creditors in
section 2-702(3) both requires that these rights be determined by the
Code itself and displaces pre-Code law. 5' This view concludes that
the Code's purpose of simplification and expansion of the seller's
right to reclaim via section 2-702(2), and its policies of uniformity
and avoidance of state-by-state variations in the law, dictate that
the reclaiming seller's rights under 2-702(2) not be cut off by a lien
creditor.' The third view is similar to the second in avoiding refer-
of which reach the same result. First, there is the Kravitz rationale, with its progression
through §§ 2-702(3), 2-403(4), and 9-301(3), with a final conclusion that the Code is basically
supportive of § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. See notes 145-47 supra.
The second approach is basically similar, but differs in the details of its application.
Crucial to it is the assertion that § 2-702(3) does not itself define the lien creditor rights to
which it refers, and that reference to § 2-403 must be made to determine these rights. Since
only subsection 2-403(4) refers to these rights, and since it merely makes a reference to Article
9, that section must be consulted to determine their content. Unlike Kravitz, however, this
approach does not look to § 9-301(3), but rather to § 9-301(1)(b), which states that the holder
of an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the interest of a lien creditor. However,
since the § 2-702(2) reclamation right is presumably not a security interest, recourse to pre-
Code law must be made to determine the relative rights of the seller and lien creditor-trustee.
At least three cases have followed this approach. See In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 511-
12 (6th Cir. 1977); In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1968); In re
Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 61, 64 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
The third approach is simply to view § 2-702(2) as a codification of the common-law
remedy of rescission for fraud, and thus to avoid its confusing relations with §§ 2-702(3), 2-
403, and 9-301. See King, supra note 2, at 82. See also In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 61, 63-64 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (citing the King article with approval).
154. In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n v. Wear, 583 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1978).
155. Id. at 1000.
156. Id. The court's language was as follows:
After careful consideration, we hold that the reference to the rights of lien creditors
in § 2-702(3) directs that those rights be found exclusively under Article 2 or in the
articles to which Article 2 cross references such as § 2-403 refer. Section 2-702(3) specifi-
cally displaces pre-Code law on the subject. We also hold that the trustee acquires no
rights under the facts existing in this case from §§ 2-403, 2-326, or 9-301. We do not
decide whether the trustee would have prevailed had the seller reserved an unperfected
security interest or if the sale had been governed by § 2-326 provisions for "sale or
return" arrangements. In sum, we hold that under Missouri law, no lien creditor could
cut off Bassett's right to reclaim under § 2-702(2). By the same token, we hold that the
trustee is not entitled under § 70(c) to cut off Bassett's reclamation petition. We favor
this analysis because, unlike that of the district court, it is consistent with the most
common understanding of the purpose of § 2-702(2)-to simplify and expand the seller's
right to reclaim. And, unlike the analyses of Kravitz and Federal's, our interpretation
comports with the Code's policy of uniformity and avoids dependence upon obscure
variations in state common law.
Id. This language was virtually the only justification the PFA court gave for its decision,
although it had previously devoted much space to a detailed discussion and refutation of a
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ence to common law, but concludes that the lien creditor should
defeat the seller.
The court adopting this approach ignored the reference in sec-
tion 2-702(3) to section 2-403 (and hence to Article 9).157 Instead, it
regarded section 2-702(3) itself as expressly subordinating the seller
to the lien creditor. 58 This approach obviously can only benefit the
lien creditor in states which have not adopted the 1966 amendment
to section 2-702(3).
Overall, the statutory and judicial trend has been toward favor-
ing the 2-702 seller over the lien creditor who relies upon section 2-
702(3). With respect to the cash seller, however, there has been a
sharper division of authority. Some decisions flatly hold that the
cash seller should prevail,'59 while others have favored the lien credi-
tor. 10 The decisions favoring the lien creditor expressly or tacitly
seem to adopt the following reasoning: (1) unpaid Code cash sellers
find a right of reclamation in section 2-702(2); (2) since the 2-702(2)
reclamation right applies in the cash sale context, its limitations",
should also apply in that context; (3) one of these limitations is the
seller's subordination to a lien creditor through the operation of
section 2-702(3). This line of reasoning has a number of serious
flaws. First, it assumes that the cash sale reclamation right is not
number of other approaches, see id. at 995-999. The scanty justification for its broad approach
left the court open to a charge of bootstrapping. A concurring opinion seemed to recognize
this problem, preferring instead the analysis used by the other circuits. See id. at 1003-07
(Henley, J., concurring). It should be noted that the majority's approach, which relies upon
the broad policies and goals of § 2-702, would apply to both the 1962 and 1972 versions of
that section.
157. See notes 147 & 153 supra and accompanying text.
158. See Countryman, supra note 2, at 457; Shanker, Reply, supra note 2, at 96-98;
Shanker, Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 40-42. This view seems to have been followed in several
cases. See In re Goodson Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387, 391-93 (S.D. Tex. 1968), affl'd,
445 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); In re Behring & Behring, 5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1968); In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46,
48-49 (D. Conn. 1965); In re Eastern Supply Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 151, 153-54 (W.D. Pa.
1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964). Professor Shanker has also argued that the § 2-702(2)
seller should be subordinated to the trustee because the goods sold should be deemed "on
sale or return" under U.C.C. § 2-326. Shanker, Reply, supra note 2, at 98-102. For a discussion
and rejection of this approach see In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n v. Wear, 583 F.2d 992, 998
(8th Cir. 1978).
159. See In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962); In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See also In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840,
845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968).
160. In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (N.D. Ind. 1975); In
re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746, 749 (M.D. Ga. 1974). See also Greater
Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Ky. 1965).
161. Cf. notes 81-87 supra and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of § 2-
702(2)'s "ten day" demand and "written misrepresentation" provisions in the context of §§
2-507(2) and 2-511(3)).
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inherent to sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) but depends instead upon
section 2-702(2). As suggested above,"'6 this is an entirely unjustified
conjunction of the cash sale sections and section 2-702. Second, as
the preceding discussion has indicated, 3 it is by no means clear
that the seller will be subordinated to the lien creditor even if sec-
tion 2-702(2) is the source of the seller's power to reclaim. Finally,
this line of reasoning could not be effective in states which have
adopted the 1966 amendment to section 2-702(3). If section 2-702(2)
does apply to cash sales, courts will probably look to common-law
rules, much as they do in most of the "credit sale" cases. Such a
resolution of the cash seller-lien creditor controversy would virtually
always favor the cash seller.'64 Finally, subordination of the cash
seller to the lien creditor seems especially inappropriate where the
reclamation is based on section 2-511(3), for this section is devoid
of express relationship to section 2-702.'11 In fact, no decision has
applied section 2-702(3) in the 2-511(3) context."'
]III. THE RECLAIMING SELLER AND THE BANKRUPTCY AcT
Besides conflicting with the rights of various Code third parties,
the reclamation rights possessed by the seller of goods also clash,"
with the rights and powers of the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. The
most common occurrence of such a conflict is when the seller deliv-
ers goods to an insolvent buyer who soon thereafter goes into bank-
ruptcy. The seller must then file a reclamation petition in order to
retake his goods. Such a conflict can also arise when the seller repos-
sesses the goods shortly before the buyer is formally adjudicated a
bankrupt. Most 6 ' of the litigation involving such seller-trustee colli-
162. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text. The reclamation right granted
unpaid sellers under §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) should be viewed as inherent to the sections
and not as dependent upon § 2-702(2). This being so, there is no reason to look to § 2-702(3)
on the question of lien creditor priorities. The preferable view is that § 2-403 alone should
govern this question. See note 112 supra.
163. See notes 145-57 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
166. But see notes 80 & 88 supra.
167. Throughout this part of the Article the Bankruptcy Act will be referred to in the
present tense, although it was largely superseded by the Bankruptcy Reform Act as of October
1, 1979. This is done solely to simplify the prose by avoiding convoluted past tense, past
perfect tense, and past participle constructions.
168. Also, there has been some seller-trustee litigation under § 64(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976). See note 204 infra. However, as that note indicates, there is a
virtual consensus among the courts which suggests that this line of attack on the seller is no
longer available to the trustee.
Although no reclaiming seller-bankruptcy cases appear to have mentioned this point, §
17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976), may provide the seller who is unable
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sions has proceeded under two Bankruptcy Act provisions-section
70(c)'6" and section 67(c).' 7 In addition, two'7' other Bankruptcy Act
provisions-section 60172 and section 70(e) '73-are potentially avail-
able to the trustee in certain instances, although neither he'- occa-
sioned much litigation . 4 This section will discuss the seller's posi-
tion vis-a-vis the trustee proceeding under sections 70(c), 67(c), 60,
and 70(e) respectively. It will also discuss the seller's possible re-
course to pre-Code remedies upon the invalidation of his Code recla-
mation right by one or more of these provisions. The preceding
discussion, especially that involving the conflicting rights of the
seller and Code third parties, is referred to frequently. It is also
likely to have considerable relevance to the examination of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act.'75
A. Section 70(c)
Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act provides in relevant part
that
[t]he trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers
of: (1) a creditor who obtained a judgment against the bankrupt upon the date
of bankruptcy, whether or not such a creditor exists, (2) a creditor who upon
to reclaim the goods in bankruptcy the opportunity to pvrsue the debtor after bankruptcy.
Section 17(a) provides in relevant part:
a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as
(2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false repre-
sentations, or for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an extension or
renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his
financial condition made or published or caused to be made or published in any manner
whatsoever with intent to deceive, or for willful and malicious conversion of the property
of another ....
See Squillante, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey-General Provisions, Sales, Bulk
Transfers and Documents of Title, 34 Bus. LAw. 1491, 1506 (1979). This section would appear
particulily relevant to the § 2-702 cases involving a written misrepresentation. The successor
to § 17(a) in the Bankruptcy Reform Act parallels the previous provision closely enough that
the seller probably retains whatever rights he had under the former statute to pursue the
debtor after bankruptcy. See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (West Supp. 1979).
169. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976).
170. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1976).
171. See also note 248 infra (discussing Bankruptcy Act § 67(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)
(1976)).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1976).
174. An interesting instance of the "law in action," one rather dissimilar to the techni-
cal "law in the books" discussed in this section, is the tendency for some bankruptcy referees
to avoid all the legal questions developed herein and simply to create a special bankruptcy
priority for all sellers shipping goods to the buyer within ten days of the bankruptcy petition.
See Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 2, at 1175.
175. See notes 313-28 infra and accompanying text.
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the date of bankruptcy obtained an execution returned unsatisfied against the
bankrupt, whether or not such a creditor exists, and (3) a creditor who upon
the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon
all property. . . upon which a creditor of the bankrupt upon a simple contract
could have obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.'",
Section 70(c) has been called the "strong-arm" clause of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. By its terms the trustee becomes an "ideal creditor...
armed cap-a-pie with every right and power which is conferred by
the law of the state upon its most favored creditor who has acquired
a lien by legal or equitable proceedings."'77 As this statement sug-
gests, the rights of a lien creditor assumed by the trustee under 70(c)
are defined by state law. 78 As it also suggests, section 70(c) does not
require the trustee to locate an actual, existing creditor who could
have or did obtain a lien; the lien holder whose rights and powers
the trustee assumes is purely hypothetical.' 79 This hypothetical lien
holder is regarded as having obtained his lien on the date of bank-
ruptcy; the obligation giving rise to that lien probably must be seen
as having been incurred at that time as well. '
From this introduction it is apparent that the fate of the re-
176. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976).
177. In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932), quoted in In re
Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822 (3rd Cir. 1960). For present purposes, the most significant status
assumed by the trustee is that given him by the third subdivision of 70(c). This tends to mesh
with the definition of a lien creditor contained in U.C.C. § 9-301(3). See notes 33 & 124 supra.
178. E.g., In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n v. Wear, 583 F.2d 992, 994 (8th Cir. 1978).
179. See 4A COLLIER, supra note 2, 70.50, at 609-14. But see Pacific Fin. Corp. v.
Edwards, 304 F.2d 224, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1962).
180. The purpose of this is to preclude the trustee from reaching back into the time
period before the date of bankruptcy and picking his optimum lien creditor. See Lewis v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961):
[I]f we construe § 70c as petitioner does, there would be no period of repose. Security
transactions entered into in good faith years before the bankruptcy could be upset if the
trustee were ingenious enough to conjure up a hypothetical situation in which a hypo-
thetical creditor might have had such a right.
However, while § 70(c) clearly requires that the obtaining of the hypothetical lien must take
place on the date of bankruptcy, it is uninformative as to the time when the obligation giving
rise to this lien must have been incurred. One 70(c) case seems tacitly to have assumed that
this obligation could predate the date of bankruptcy. See In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3rd
Cir. 1960); Mann & Phillips, Federal's, supra note 2, at 664 & n.169. A subsequent Supreme
Court decision appears to have concluded that both the underlying obligation and the obtain-
ing of the lien were to be treated as taking place on the date of bankruptcy. See Lewis v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 604, 607 (1961). Despite this, § 70(c) and Lewis have
been read as requiring that the underlying debt not be regarded as having been incurred at
any particular time at all. See In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1977). See
also Mann & Phillips, Federal's, supra note 2, at 663-64. This view of § 70(c), however, might
make it impossible to determine seller-trustee priorities. See id. at 664 n.169. But the purpose
of the In re Federal's holding may have been substantially to diminish the trustee's rights,
to make him "about the lowest form of creditor." In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 514 (6th
Cir. 1977).
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claiming seller in a bankruptcy proceeding in which the trustee
employs section 70(c) depends upon how such a seller would fare as
against an attaching lien creditor under state law. As indicated
above,'"' this question has occasioned much disagreement and vast
theoretical confusion in the twenty years preceding enactment of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Despite this, however, a substantial
consensus in favor of the 2-702 seller has emerged in the federal
appeals courts.' 8 No similar consensus is apparent in the case of the
cash seller,' but, since the decisions favoring the lien creditor-
trustee rest on spurious premises,'84 the cash seller should also pre-
vail. Thus, despite the controversy surrounding it, section 70(c) of
the Bankruptcy Act has tended over time to pose less and less of an
obstacle to the seller's ability to reclaim goods in bankruptcy.'8 5
B. Section 67(c)
Section 67(b)' 81 of the Bankruptcy Act validates a broad range
of statutory liens as against the trustee. However, section
67(c)(1)(B) of the Act carves out a wide exception to section 67(b)
by stating that "every statutory lien which is not perfected or en-
forceable at the date of bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights
181. See generally notes 124-66 supra and accompanying text.
182. See In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n v. Wear, 583 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1978); In re
Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977). See also In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir.
1960) (held for the trustee but did so on a common-law basis which would have favored the
seller in most states); notes 128, 138, 152-56 supra and accompanying text. Also supporting
the seller is In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 61 (E.D. Tenn. 1970). See also In
re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968) (not involving bankruptcy). But see In
re Goodson Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387 (S.D. Tex. 1978); In re Behring & Behring,
5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600 (N.D. Tex. 1968), affl'd, 415 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971); In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46 (D. Conn. 1965); In re Eastern
Supply Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1963), affl'd, 331 F.2d 852 (3rd Cir. 1964).
183. See In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (holding
for the seller); In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See also In re Helms Veneer
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968) (distinguished Mort because of the absence
of a ten day demand, and because the actual bankruptcy section at issue was uncertain, but
in which the court seemed willing to find for the cash seller in an appropriate case). But see
In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1246-48 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Richardson Homes Corp.,
18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384 (N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
746, 749 (M.D. Ga. 1974); Greater Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387
S.W.2d 17, 20 (Ky. 1965).
184. Specifically, these unfounded assertions are that (1) the lien creditor is a good faith
purchaser entitled to defeat the seller via U.C.C. § 2-403; (2) the cash and credit sale reclama-
tion rights are security interests which, if unperfected, will be defeated by a lien creditor
under U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b); and (3) that the cash and credit sellers are subordinated to a
lien creditor via U.C.C. § 2-702(3). See generally notes 124-66 supra and accompanying text.
185. This trend has probably been furthered by the 1966 amendment to U.C.C. § 2-
702(3) deleting its "or lien creditor" language. See notes 148-51 supra and accompanying text.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1976).
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of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor on that date, whether or
not such a purchaser exists, . . .shall be invalid against the trus-
tee.' 1 7 Since the reclaiming Code seller clearly'is subordinate to
such a purchaser,' 8 characterization of the seller's reclamation right
as a "statutory lien" would subordinate him to the buyer's trustee. 9
There has been no litigation regarding the status of either section
2-507(2) or section 2-511(3) as a statutory lien.90 However, several
courts have held that section 2-702(2) is a statutory lien invalidated
by section 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act, " ' although every fed-
eral appellate case considering this issue has held that section 2-
702(2) is not a statutory lien. "' Since there seems to be little differ-
ence between the Code cash and credit sale reclamation rights for
"statutory lien" purposes, they will be considered together below.
Section 1(29a) of the Bankruptcy Act defines a statutory lien
as "a lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified circum-
stances or conditions . . . .." While sections 2-702(2), 2-507(2),
and 2-511(3) would plainly seem to qualify as "statutes," the Bank-
ruptcy Act definition speaks of a lien "arising solely by force of
statute"; some courts, noting section 2-702(2)'s close relationship
with the common-law remedy of rescission for fraud, have argued
that section 2-702(2) is not "solely statutory," since it is for the most
part a codification of common-law rules.'94 Other courts, while not
187. Id. § 107(c)(1)(B).
188. See notes 107-15 supra and accompanying text.
189. Also the § 2-702(2) credit seller is covered by § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act,
which provides that "every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency
of the debtor" is "invalid against the trustee." 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1976).
190. But cf. Dugan, supra note 2, at 368-69 (arguing that the cash seller should lose to
the trustee under section 67(c)).
191. See In re Neisner Bros., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re
Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 938, 942-43 (E.D. Pa. 1977); In re Perskey & Wolf,
Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 812 (N.D. Ohio 1976); In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Good
Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D.N.J. 1974). See also In re J.R. Nieves &
Co., 446 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1971); In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), affl'd, 402 F.2d
796 (5th Cir. 1968) (interpreting civil codes).
192. See In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n v. Wear, 583 F.2d 992, 1000-3 (8th Cir. 1978);
In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1977); In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.,
524 F.2d 761, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1975). See also In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1976).
194. As the court stated in In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 1977):
[W]e must agree with the district court's observation that § 2-702 is more than a mere
codification of common law. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the right asserted by
the seller under § 2-702(2) is a valid state-created right of ownership. Because that right
conceptually has its antecedents in the historical and equitable right of a defrauded
seller to reclaim the goods he has sold to an insolvent buyer, we hold it cannot be said
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rejecting the framework of this argument, have contended that the
differences between section 2-702(2) and its common-law counter-
parts are sufficiently great to put section 2-702(2) within the reach
of the section 1(29a) definition.'95 As for sections 2-507(2), and 2-
511(3), without inquiring into the obscure question whether these
sections are "really" closer to their pre-Code analogues than is sec-
tion 2-702(2) to its forbears, it ought to be reiterated that sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3) are quite closely related to the common-law
"cash sale doctrine."''9
The term "lien" is not defined by the Code or the Bankruptcy
Act. Generally, a lien is regarded as a hold on property for the
payment of some debt, obligation, or duty.' 7 Obviously, the Code
reclamation rights could fit within the confines of this rather broad
definition. However, the seller's right under the "cash sale" doctrine
was not termed a "lien" at common law, and was distinguished from
lien-like devices such as the conditional sale.' In addition, it has
been argued that section 2-702(2) should not be regarded as a lien,
because a lien holder can sell the encumbered property and still
recover any remaining debt from the debtor, while the 2-702(2) re-
claimant is limited to recovery of the goods.'99 Although this argu-
ment is based to some degree on the exclusivity provision of section
2-702(3),211 it should also be valid in the 2-507(2) or 2-511(3) context,
since under neither section does the seller have a remedy beyond
repossession of the goods sold. On the other hand, it has been argued
that the section 2-702(2) right should indeed be regarded as a lien,
since both a lien and the 2-702(2) reclamation right terminate upon
payment of the debt. 20' But, while this argument would also apply
to sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3), it would further seem to control
most of the unpaid seller's general Code remedies, few of which are
to arise "solely by force of statute" under § 1(29).
(emphasis added). See also In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Assn., 583 F.2d 992, 1002-03 (8th Cir.
1978); In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
195. See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 889-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re
Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
196. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., 51 AM. JuR. 2d Liens § 1 (1970); BLACK'S LAW DiCIONARY 832 (5th ed.
1979). For a compendium of definitions of the term, see Note, Uniform Commercial Code-
§ 2-702: Conflict with 67c(1)(A) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 53 N.C.L. Rnv. 169, 172-73
(1974).
198. See note 22 supra.
199. See In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430, 432-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
200. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) provides that: "Successful reclamation of goods excludes all
other remedies with respect to them."
201. See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Sbrv. 887, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re
Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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likely to characterized as "liens. '202
In view of the disagreement and uncertainty regarding the
"solely statutory" and "lien" questions, many courts have looked to
the legislative history of section 67(c) in an attempt to resolve the
question of section 2-702(2)'s status. Prior to 1938, the Bankruptcy
Act accorded recognition to state-created priorities, thus allowing
the states substantial power to determine which creditors' claims
should be recognized after the satisfaction of certain other inter-
ests.21 3 In that year, however, the Act was amended to eliminate this
recognition."' Following this amendment, some states tried to fur-
ther certain interests by casting what seemed to be priorities in the
form of liens, thus ensuring their predominance under section 67.205
In response, Congress amended section 67 in 1966 to expand the list
of statutory liens specifically declared invalid in bankruptcy,2 00 in-
cluding the section 67(c)(1)(A) and 67(c)(1)(B) invalidations at
issue here. Thus, the legislative history of this section can be seen
as an ongoing process whereby Congress has specifically and repeat-
edly rebuffed the efforts of the states to subvert federal bankruptcy
standards. Some courts have relied on. this history to support the
holding that section 2-702(2) is one of the classes of statutory liens
intended to be invalidated by section 67(c)(1) (A) .207 Similar reason-
ing could easily apply with respect to section 67(c)(1)(B) and sec-
202. See U.C.C. § 2-703. This section makes the listed seller's remedies dependent upon
(among other things) the buyer's failure "to make a payment due on or before delivery."
Presumably, the seller's action for the price, at least, would terminate upon payment of the
price. And it is not obvious how this remedy could be regarded as a "lien," since it does not
seem to involve any sort of hold or claim on the good sold. See U.C.C. § 2-709.
203. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64, 30 Stat. 563.
204. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 64, 52 Stat. 874. This elimination of certain "state-
created priorities" has caused some courts to conclude that § 2-702 qualifies as such a priority
and thus is invalid in bankruptcy under § 64(a), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976). See, e.g., In re
Neisner Bros., Inc., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Perskey & Wolf,
Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 812, 816-17 (N.D. Ohio 1976); In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep
Serv. 1142, 1151-52 (E.D. Mich. 1973), affl'd, 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1365-67 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
The Federal's decision was reversed, however, in In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 518 (6th
Cir. 1977), and this decision should dispose of Perskey as well. Also, the two other circuits
considering this question have ruled that § 2-702 is not an invalid state-created priority. In
re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n., 583 F.2d 992, 1000-03 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Telemart Enter-
prises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1975). Thus, only the Neisner case can now be said to
stand for this proposition, and the idea that § 2-702 is a "state-created priority" is probably
a dead letter.
205. See, e.g., In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
206. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ 3-4, 80 Stat. 268-69 (codified in 11
U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A), (B), (C) (1976)). The general recognition of statutory liens in bank-
ruptcy was retained in the new § 67(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1976).
207. See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re
Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 427-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Good Deal Super
Mkts. Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D.N.J. 1974).
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tions 2-507(2) and 2-511(3).
There are problems with this line of reasoning, however. First,
it by no means enjoys unanimous support, and has been rejected by
the three circuit courts considering the question."8 Second, since the
common-law analogues of sections 2-702(2), 2-507(2), and 2-511(3)
existed before the post-1938 developments which the 1966 amend-
ments addressed, these sections do not seem to be the evils at which
those amendments were directed. 219 Supporting this contention is
the fact that the legislative history of the 1966 amendments is de-
void of reference to section 2-702(2), and seems not to refer to sec-
tions 2-507(2) and 2-511(3).2 'o However, one of the relevant Senate
Reports stated that section 67(c)(1)(B)
strikes at a lien which is so tenuous that it can be defeated by transfer to a
bona fide purchaser. The holders of such liens have reason to know that their
security is extremely vulnerable. It would seem that if, apart from bankruptcy,
a lien is not good against a bona fide purchaser, then it should not be valid
against the trustee.
21'
While this language is of course limited to "liens," it does suggest
that any sort of seller interest which is subordinate to a good faith
208. In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n., 583 F.2d 992, 1000-03 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Fed-
eral's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1977); In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d
761, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1975).
209. See In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1975):
Section 67c is thus a remedial trimming-back of the special exemption conferred on
statutory liens by section 67b. It was not intended to serve as a new tool by which the
trustee could cut down provisions of state law obviously not entitled to the benefits of
section 67b.
The court in In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n., 583 F.2d 992, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 1978), stated as
follows:
Section 2-702 is not an attempt to elevate a group of creditors that have historically
found themselves in the general distribution of a bankrupt's estate. It is the exclusive
substitute for the long respected right to reclaim. Viewed realistically, it is not more
objectionable to bankruptcy policy than its pre-Code antecedent . . . . [W]e think it
likely that Congress continues to prefer the equities of sellers under § 2-702(2) to those
of general creditors for much the same reasons that it permitted a seller to reclaim under
pre-Code law.
210. This is at least true of the Senate Reports accompanying that legislation. See S.
REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966),
reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2442-68. In In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d
509, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1977), the court said:
We conclude that the right of reclamation under § 2-702(2) is not the kind of lien
which Congress intended to invalidate by § 67c(1)(A). We note the total lack of reference
to § 2-702 in the legislative history of the 1966 amendments. So extensive a provision of
state law would hardly escape notice if it were one of the legitimate targets of the
amendment. We attribute this absence of reference not to oversight, but to the more
likely explanation that the Congress viewed the Code provision as did its authors: a basic
updating of the equitable remedies of rescission.
211. S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2456, 2461.
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purchaser's rights might be invalidated by section 67(c). This must,
however, be read in its context-section 67(c)'s enumeration of ex-
ceptions to section 67(b)'s general recognition of statutory liens.
Thus, if sections 2-702(2), 2-507(2), and 2-511(3) are not deemed
"statutory liens," this language should be of no consequence. The
same Senate Report also suggests that the 1966 amendments were
aimed in part at "liens creating a noncontingent property interest
in a specific asset. ' ' 2 While the reclaiming seller's interest is cer-
tainly "in a specific asset," it would clearly seem to be "contingent"
upon factors such as the buyer's failure to pay, the ten day limita-
tion or other waiver requirements, and so forth.213
To conclude, the status of sections 2-702(2), 2-507(2), and 2-
511(3) as "statutory liens" invalidated in bankruptcy by sections
67(c)(1)(A) or 67(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act is at best uncer-
tain. Given the history and the common-law antecedents of these
Code provisions, however, it is highly doubtful whether they can be
considered "solely statutory," or as "liens," or as the sort of state-
created rights intended to be affected by the 1966 amendments to
section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act. In .fact, it is unclear whether
section 67 of the Act is directed to such Code reclamation rights at
all. In the 2-702(2) context, characterization of the section as creat-
ing a statutory lien often appears to be little more than a referee-
inspired contrivance for avoiding the pro-seller implications of In re
Kravitz.2 1 1 Finally, as has been mentioned, the most authoritative
precedent on this question flatly rejects the notion that section 2-
702(2) should be considered a statutory lien subject to section 67.
There seems to be no reason to treat the Code cash seller differently.
C. Section 60
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act is intended to invalidate cer-
tain "preferential" transfers from the debtor to favored creditors
before the date of bankruptcy. 215 For our purposes, its key provision
is section 60(a)(1), which defines a "preference" as
212. Id. at 2457.
213. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 224-31.
214. See notes 145-74 supra and accompanying text.
215. One author has stated:
Early attacks upon the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 were soundly repulsed on the floor
of Congress by harking back to the evils of grab-law which had led to the almost ceaseless
search for a satisfactory Bankruptcy Act during the two decades preceding 1898. Besides
the evils of the disturbance of business due to the race of diligence with its accompanying
midnight attachments and all the other paraphernalia of the race, Congress was re-
minded of the chilling effect upon credit of the practice of insolvents transferring their
assets to friends and relatives.
See J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKauprcy 284 (1956).
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a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a debtor to or for
the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or
suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the
filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title,
the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class. 21'
Under section 60(b), a preference can "be avoided by the trustee if
the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby. . . . has, at the
time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor is insolvent.
'" 21 7
Although pre-bankruptcy repossessions by cash sellers and de-
frauded credit sellers were not regarded as preferential before the
advent of the Code, '21 8 there have been only two U.C.C. cases directly
dealing with these questions. 29 Given this scarcity of authority, it
is necessary to consider the elements of a voidable preference in an
attempt to ascertain whether these U.C.C. reclamation rights might
be so regarded. Some of these elements-such as the fact of a
"transfer, ' 220 the four month time period, and the effect of giving the
creditor a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the
same class22-should not pose major problems for such an effort.
216. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976) (no longer in force). See also 3 COLLIER, supra note 2,
60.02, at 758-61.
217. 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976) (no longer in force).
218. For the case of the defrauded credit seller see note 36 supra and accompanying
text. However, the nondefrauded credit seller seems to have been unable to recover. See id.
No case seems to deal clearly with the competing rights of a pre-Code cash seller and a trustee
proceeding under § 60. There is little doubt, however, regarding the cash seller's general
ability to defeat the trustee. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. Also, the seller was
usually able to prevail in consignment or bailment cases involving a similar retention of title
by the seller. See Kemp-Booth Co. v. Calvin, 84 F.2d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1936); In re Wright-
Dana Hardware Co., 205 F. 335 (N.D.N.Y. 1913), affl'd, 211 F. 908 (2d Cir. 1914). See also
notes 232, 234, 239 infra and accompanying text.
219. See In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n., 583 F.2d 992, 1003 (8th Cir. 1978) (concluding
that a § 2-702 reclamation was not a voidable preference under § 60). However, this case
clearly involved a post-bankruptcy reclamation petition. See id. at 993-94; Peck v. Augustin,
279 N.W.2d 297, 400-01 (Neb. 1979) (cash seller victorious). The only other § 2-702 case
mentioning § 60 is In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975). See note
237 infra. This case, however, involved a trustee proceeding under Bankruptcy Act §§ 64 and
67(c). The only cases mentioning § 60 in the Code cash sale context are In re Colacci's of
America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974) and In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Va. 1968) (which was not clearly a § 60 case), but neither addressed the clash
between § 60 and these Code sections.
220. The Bankruptcy Act definition of the term "transfer," see 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976),
easily encompasses the physical repossession of goods. In addition, the seller might be deemed
to have repossessed the goods even where he merely made a demand for them. See In re Bel
Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 1971).
221. Here, since general creditors rarely realize their full claim in bankruptcy, a seller
who manages physical repossession of goods prior to bankruptcy would almost always obtain
a greater percentage of his claim than an otherwise-similarly-situated creditor who failed to
repossess.
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Four others, however, deserve more discussion. First, section 60(b)
requires that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe the
debtor to be insolvent when he repossesses."' Since the 2-702(2)
reclamation right is premised on the seller's discovery of the buyer's
insolvency, this requirement should not give the trustee any diffi-
culty when he confronts a credit seller.22 This conclusion is some-
what less certain in the case of the Code cash seller,24 however,
because of the range of factors relevant to resolution of the
"reasonable cause" question.2 2 In particular, neither a simple sei-
zure of the goods2 nor the receipt of a bad check 2 -the two factors
common to almost all cash sale repossessions-is regarded as neces-
sarily dispositive on this point. Of course, in the typical cash sale
repossession case both these factors are present in such a fashion as
to suggest strongly the seller's knowledge that all was not well with
the buyer financially, since the seller ordinarily would not repossess
merely upon learning that the check has been dishonored. As a
result, it is likely that only a few Code cash sellers will be able to
escape the trustee by arguing the absence of reasonable cause to
believe in the buyer's insolvency.
Second, it is possible that the reclaiming seller might not qual-
ify as a "creditor" under section 60(a). The Bankruptcy Act defines
a "creditor" as "anyone who owns a debt, demand or claim provable
in bankruptcy, 2 8 a definition within which the Code cash and
222. This requirement should usually be satisfied under either the Code definition of
insolvency contained in U.C.C. § 1-201(23) or the Bankruptcy Act definition contained in 11
U.S.C. § 1(19) (1976). However, it is possible that the broader Code definition may create a
situation where the buyer is insolvent for U.C.C. purposes, but not for bankruptcy purposes.
But see 4 COLLIER, supra note 2, 67.281 [2.1], at 419-20, where it is suggested that the state
law definition of insolvency should apply in case of a discrepancy.
223. It should be noted, however, that the § 60(b) test is objective (reasonable cause to
believe) and the § 2-702(2) test is subjective (actual discovery by the seller).
224. If the Code cash sale reclamation right is based on § 2-702(2), see notes 76-78 supra
and accompanying text, this difference should disappear; this Article has rejected that view
of the Code cash sale reclamation right. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
225. See generally 3 COLLIER, supra note 2, 60.52-56.
226. Compare Brown v. Tru-lite, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 800, 804-05 (W.D. La. 1975) (seizure
of goods by itself does not necessarily create finding of reasonable cause or a duty to investi-
gate; each case must be considered on own facts) with Bossak & Co. v. Coxe, 285 F. 147 (5th
Cir. 1922) (recovery of goods then worth 50% of their sale price sufficient to establish reasona-
ble cause).
227. Compare C. A. Swanson & Sons Poultry Co. v. Wylie, 237 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir.
1956) (NSF check one factor among many to be considered) and Dinkelspiel v. Weaver, 116
F. Supp. 455, 462-64 (W.D. Ark. 1953) (NSF check not conclusive; must consider other
circumstances) with Robie v. Myers Equip. Co., 114 F. Supp. 177 (D. Minn. 1953) (disho-
nored check plus subsequent offer of postdated checks enough to create finding of reasonable
cause) and Conners v. Bucksport Nat'l Bank, 214 F. 847, 849-50 (D. Me.), affl'd, 216 F. 990
(1st Cir. 1914) (bad checks plus other information enough for finding of reasonable cause).
228. 11 U.S.C. § 1(11) (1976).
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credit sellers would seem easily to fit. However, there is a substan-
tial line of authority to the effect that one whose property is stolen,
misappropriated, conmerted, or fraudulently obtained is not a
"creditor" under 60(a) if he stands on his rights as owner and de-
mands return of the goods without in any way treating the buyer as
a debtor. 29 The cases announcing this rule generally seem to involve
fraud-like situations, and section 2-702(2), of course, is a direct
descendant of the seller's common-law right of rescission for fraud.-0
In fact, some commentators have put considerable emphasis on this
common-law antecedency in arguing that section 2-702(2) should
not create a voidable preference. 23' The Code cash seller might be
treated similarly, since some "bad check" situations can easily be
regarded as involving fraud or something quite like it.232 In the ab-
sence of any authority dealing with this argument under the Code,
however, it must be regarded as uncertain at best.
Third, both the cash and credit sellers might argue that the
repossession did not involve "the property of a debtor." This would
be based on the assertion that in each case full title23' did not pass
to the buyer because of his failure to pay or his failure to receive the
goods while solvent, respectively. At common law, such an argu-
ment would have been almost sure to succeed in both cases. 23 4 On
229. 3 COLLIER, supra note 2, 60.18. One case, citing this section, has applied this
reasoning to a cash sale. See Peck v. Augustin, 279 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Neb. 1979).
230. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., R. NORDSTROM, supra note 2, at 511; King, Voidable Preferences, supra
note 2, at 939-40; Note, supra note 2, at 612.
232. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text. The idea that the reclaiming cash
seller was not to be treated as a "creditor" is also suggested by the following:
The fact should be observed that modem business practice regards checks as cash.
Accordingly, the holder of a check given for a cash sale by him does not become a creditor
merely by waiting a week or two to cash it, and even if such a check is returned insuffi-
cient funds, he may not be treated as a creditor, at least the first time he has the
experience with a particular debtor, when there is nothing else to put him on enquiry.
But it has been held that taking property other than the property sold in satisfaction of
a bad check is an election to treat the buyer as a debtor.
J. MACLACHAN, supra note 215, at 292 (emphasis added).
While the body of the passage speaks of the "simultaneous" exchange of goods and payment,
see note 238 infra and accompanying text, its last sentence seems to suggest that a reposses-
sion of the actual property sold would not be preferential.
233. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 2, 60.07, at 791 (stating that the § 60(a) "property of
the debtor" requirement is basically the same as the test for the trustee's acquisition of the
bankrupt's title under § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976)).
234. This is because in the cash sale the non-paying buyer was regarded as not acquiring
title to goods delivered to him, and because in a credit sale characterized by the buyer's fraud,
the buyer took only a voidable title which was subject to a retroactive divestment by the
seller. See notes 6, 21, 29 supra and accompanying text. See also 4A COLLIER, supra note 2,
70.19[5], at 242-44, which states the general rule that the trustee does not acquire title to
the debtor's property under § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976), where the bankrupt buyer
obtains goods in a cash sale (including a bad check sale).
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the other hand, sections 2-507(2), 2-511(3), and 2-702(2) do not spe-
cifically refer to title, and the Code generally deemphasizes the
"title" concept.2 5 As with the "creditor" concept, it could be argued
that Code cash and credit sellers are sufficiently similar in sub-
stance to their common-law counterparts to justify the pre-Code
result?6-e It may be possible, however, to utilize the Comments to
U.C.C. section 2-401 to avoid recourse to common-law analogies and
to defeat the reclaiming seller. Comment 1 to section 2-401 states
an instance in which considerations of "title" may be relevant:
where the "applicability of 'public' regulation depends upon . . .
location of 'title' without further definition . . [i]t is . . . neces-
sary to state . . . when title passes under this Article in case the
courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined term
of the 'private' law." U.C.C. section 2-401(1)-(3) specifies when the
time title passes becomes relevant. For example, U.C.C. section
2-401(2) states that title usually passes upon the completion of the
seller's performance with respect to the goods. Thus, if the Bank-
ruptcy Act is regarded as the appropriate sort of "public regula-
tion," the passage of title in a 2-702(2), 2-507(2), or 2-511(3) case
might be deemed to have taken place at the time of delivery, at least
for purposes of section 60. If so, the seller's reclamation of goods
would involve a transfer of the property of a debtor. If all the other
elements of a preference are met, the reclamation would be a voida-
ble preference under section 60. Again, the absence of case law
authority makes this argument somewhat tentative, but it presents
a way to avoid resorting to common-law analogies to determine the
status of the Code seller.
Finally, there is some question whether a U.C.C. or common-
law cash sale reclamation could be regarded as "for or on account
of an antecedent debt" under section 60(a). In a sale involving the
extension of credit, either the buyer's payment or the seller's recla-
mation upon the buyer's failure to pay would clearly be based upon
a preexisting debt.27 In a cash sale, however, the buyer's transfer of
235. See U.C.C. § 2-401.
236. See notes 230-32 supra and accompanying text.
237. This follows from the general nature of a credit transaction, which involves the
transfer of title (and, presumably, creation of a debt) at the completion of the contract of
sale, thus making the subsequent payment or retransfer of the goods "for or on account of an
antecedent debt." See note 4 supra and accompanying text. For instance, it is generally
conceded that any transfer from the buyer to the seller in a nonfraud credit transaction is for
or on account of an antecedent debt. See, e.g., In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840,
843 (W.D. Va. 1968). However, there is dictum in one § 2-702 case which conflicts with this
conclusion:
[uInder section 2-702(2) receipt of goods on credit while insolvent is deemed a fraud
on the creditor rendering the sale voidable. The sale thus is defective from its inception.
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consideration in exchange for the goods sold has traditionally been
viewed as essentially simultaneous with the transfer of the goods,
and thus as not "for or on account of an antecedent debt." 3 ' This
reasoning does not apply as neatly to the situation in which the
seller transfers goods in exchange for the buyer's check, the check
is not paid upon presentment, and the seller then reclaims the
goods. In that case, there is a considerable lapse of time between the
creation of the buyer's obligation and the seller's repossession, and
repossession there could easily be regarded as based upon a pre-
existing debt. This line of reasoning puts the seller in an impossible
position, however, since he obviously cannot reclaim the goods at
the exact moment the check is dishonored, or at whatever other time
the debt is deemed to have arisen. 5 In fact, acceptance of this
argument makes the cash sale reclamation right a nullity in the
prebankruptcy context, 20 rendering the cash seller indistin-
guishable from the credit seller. For these reasons, it might be pre-
ferable to regard the cash seller's repossession as relating back to the
time the right of reclamation arose 241-that is, the time the debt was
created-assuming that the seller makes a due presentment and
Clearly no new security has been given for an antecedent debt; the "lien," if it is
conceived as such, attached at the instant the debt was created. Because no transfer is
made on account of an antecedent debt, section 60 could never be applicable.
In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1975). What this language seems
to suggest is that the § 2-702 reclamation right should be regarded as having come into effect
at the time of creation of the debt, and that any subsequent repossession should be treated
as relating back to that time. Telemart involved Bankruptcy Act §§ 64 and 67(c), but much
of its reasoning proceeded via § 60.
238. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 2, T 60.19, 60.23, at 847-49, 872-73. It is often said that
any extension of credit, no matter how brief, can change a cash sale into a credit sale and
render any transfer by the buyer to the seller preferential, see, e.g., In re Helms Veneer Corp.,
287 F. Supp. 840, 843 (W.D. Va. 1968), but this should not include the situation in which
the seller delays for a reasonable time in presenting a check for payment. See note 103 supra
and accompanying text.
239. It should be noted that the argument made here in terms of the U.C.C. cash seller
is broad enough to encompass the pre-Code cash seller as well. It is likely, however, that the
common-law cash seller would have defeated a trustee proceeding under § 60, see note 218
supra and accompanying text, but probably on the basis of the trustee's failure to show that
the repossession involved the property of the debtor. See note 234 supra and accompanying
text. In the case of the Code cash seller, this title-based argument is probably not applicable.
See text accompanying note 236 supra. Attention is thus forced to the "antecedent debt"
issue discussed here.
240. Consider, for instance, the by no means hypothetical situation in which the seller
who conveys goods to the buyer on "cash" terms in expectation of immediate payment is not
paid, and immediately repossesses the goods. Is the very brief lapse of time between the
creation of the "debt" (assuming that this time can be exactly specified) and the repossession
to be regarded as making that repossession "for or on account of an antecedent debt" and
thus preferential?
241. See note 237 supra. This argument should apply with even greater force to the cash
sale situation, for the reasons discussed above.
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then acts swiftly enough to satisfy 2-507(2) "demand" and "waiver"
requirements.2 12 Under this line of reasoning, if the seller reacts with
sufficient speed his reclamation would be treated as occurring at
substantially the same time as the creation of the debt, and not "for
or on account of an antecedent debt." Again, however, the absence
of case authority renders this argument inconclusive. It is apparent,
then, that for all the reasons suggested above the prospects of the
repossessing seller confronted by section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act
obviously are far from certain.2 13
D. Section 70(e)
Another possible weapon for the trustee to use against the re-
claiming seller is section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act. 24 This sec-
tion, conceivably the most damaging, provides:
A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor adjudged a
bankrupt under this title which, under any Federal or State law applicable
thereto, is fraudulent as against or voidable for any other reason by any credi-
tor of the debtor, having a claim provable under this title, shall be null and
void as against the trustee of such debtor.
This language would appear to apply either to a reclamation com-
pleted before bankruptcy ("any transfer of an interest of the
debtor") or to a demand for reclamation made after the filing ("any
obligation incurred by the debtor").
245
Section 70(e) requires that the trustee locate an actual creditor
who can avoid the seller's reclamation.2 11 It would appear that a
general creditor, who by definition does not have an interest in
specific property, would not have the power to avoid a reclamation
242. See notes 81-88, 103-04 supra and accompanying text. One case, stating that there
is no transfer on account of an antecedent debt because "the title is voidable," has held for
the cash seller on similar facts. Peck v. Augustin, 279 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Neb. 1979).
243. The general uncertainty surrounding the relative rights of the repossessing seller
and the trustee who proceeds under § 60 might suggest an anomalous strategy for the unpaid
seller: never to attempt reclamation before bankruptcy, but instead to file a postbankruptcy
reclamation petition. In that case, the trustee would be required to employ Bankruptcy Act
provisions (e.g., §§ 67(c) and 80(c)) relatively less advantageous to him. The anomaly in this
strategy is that on this theory the seller who acts less promptly would have greater chances
of success. The seller might turn this anomaly to his advantage, by arguing that his rights
when he acts promptly to repossess the goods should be no less than when he delays his
efforts.
244. 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1976). To date, no trustee seems to have employed this section
in the context of §§ 2-702, 2-507(2) or 2-511(3). See note 257 infra.
245. In this context, § 70(e)'s "transfer" language would limit the trustee to attacking
prebankruptcy repossessions because they are the only kinds of physical reclamations rele-
vant here. The "any obligation incurred by the debtor" language would not appear to be so
limited, and would appear to give the trustee the power to stand in the shoes of an appropriate
creditor who could avoid the buyer's obligation to return the goods to the seller.
246. See 4B COLLIER, supra note 2, 70.90, at 1029-30.
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by the seller. An actual secured party or an actual lien creditor,
however, might be more useful to the trustee. In this regard, section
70(e) also requires that the actual creditor have a provable claim.
The Article 9 secured party and the lien creditor certainly meet the
literal requirements imposed by the Bankruptcy Act for satisfaction
of this requirement.247 Despite this, however, it has been asserted
that in order to assume the position of an actual lien creditor 211 or
secured party249 the trustee must himself be able to avoid either
party's claim in bankruptcy. If this hurdle is overcome, section 70(e)
will subrogate the trustee to the rights of the creditor, and render
the debtor's transfer or obligation "null and void against the trus-
tee" if the creditor could defeat the seller. The trustee attempting
to stand in place of an actual lien creditor of the debtor will confront
problems similar to those faced by the trustee utilizing section 70(c)
247. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1976). See 4A COLLIER, supra note 2, 70.90, at 1034-35.
248. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 24-8, at 890-91. The trustee would
ordinarily be able to defeat the lien creditor under § 67(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(a) (1976). Section 67(a)(1) grants the trustee the right to avoid liens obtained by
attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding within four
months before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy if at the time the lien was obtained the
person against whom it was obtained was insolvent. In addition, under § 67(a)(3) the trustee
could then preserve the lien for the benefit of the estate, and thereby gain whatever rights
the lien creditor had.
In states where the lien creditor has rights superior to those of the reclaiming seller, §
67(a) might also be of some use to the trustee. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 1292. Under its
provisions, if an actual creditor of an insolvent buyer obtains an appropriate lien against him
subsequent to delivery of the goods and within four months of bankruptcy, the trustee could
avoid that lien and preserve it for the benefit of the estate, thereby gaining whatever rights
the lien creditor had. In the case of the reclaiming seller, the trustee should prevail over the
seller to the extent of the lien.
Section 67(a) should not assist the trustee in states where the seller will defeat the lien
creditor, since the lien the trustee avoids and preserves is of no effect against the seller under
state law. It has also been suggested that § 67(a) may only apply to liens attaching to property
to which the trustee succeeds under § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976), which grants the
trustee the title of the bankrupt as of the date of bankruptcy. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 2,
67.03, at 66.2. If so, and if the seller regains full title to the goods by reclaiming before
bankruptcy, then § 67(a) would be of no help to a trustee.
249. Professor Kennedy has argued strenuously that a trustee should not be permitted
to use the claim of a secured creditor unless the trustee could himself avoid the secured
creditor's claim. Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1419, 1428-34 (1967). See also J. MAcLAcHLAN,
supra note 215, at 335-36; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 24-8, at 890-91. This issue
has not been resolved by the courts, see id., but appears to be settled by the new Act. See
notes 342-45 infra and accompanying text. Professor Kennedy's argument, if accepted by a
court, would help the reclaiming seller if the secured party had perfected his interest, for the
trustee usually could not avoid this interest. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2,
§ 24-1, at 865-66. If, however, the Article 9 security interest were unperfected, the trustee
could himself displace it under U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) and thereby, even under Professor
Kennedy's limitation, defeat the reclaiming seller.
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and often will be unable to defeat the seller. =0 A creditor with a
perfected Article 9 security interest in after-acquired property could
avoid the reclamation, however, because such creditors have been
deemed good faith purchasers for value,2' and because the Code
cash and credit sale reclamation rights are subordinate to the rights
of a good faith purchaser by section 2-403(1) or section 2-702(3).212
Thus, if the trustee is allowed to assume the position of an Article
9 secured party, and if he can locate such a party,23 he should be
able to prevail over the reclaiming seller. Moreover, under the
much-critized doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 254 the trustee is empowered
to displace the entire claim of the reclaiming seller, even if the value
of the goods sold exceeds the creditor's claim. 255 Thus, while the
trustee's ability to assume the position of an actual lien creditor
may seldom prove advantageous to him, his power to utilize the
rights of an existing Article 9 secured party could be a very potent
weapon against the seller,?- especially in light of Moore.
E. Reversion to Common Law
If the trustee proves successful in employing one or more of
250. See notes 181-85 supra and accompanying text. Section 70(e) might be redundant
in this case, since § 70(c) would obviate the need for an actual lien creditor. Section 70(c) is
of no use, however, when the seller repossesses before bankruptcy. See Mann & Phillips, The
Reclaiming Seller, supra note 2, at 633-34. Moreover, § 70(e) does not limit the trustee to
the position of a lien creditor who obtained his lien on the date of bankruptcy. See J. MAC-
LACHLAN, supra note 215, at 329. See also note 180 supra. Note that, given the usual time
period between delivery of the goods and either their reclamation or the date of bankruptcy,
the probability of an actual creditor attaching or levying is not great.
251. See notes 116-22 supra and accompanying text.
252. See notes 107-15 supra and accompanying text.
253. A creditor with an Article 9 security interest in after-acquired property would, of
course, suffice. See Dugan, supra note 2, at 330-34.
254. 284 U.S. 4 (1931). See J. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 215, at 330-33; Kennedy, supra
note 249, at 1421. Professor Kennedy notes that the result of Moore "contravenes a fundamen-
tal attribute of subrogation-that the person subrogated acquires no greater rights than those
of the person to whose position he is subrogated." Id.
255. Thus, if, for instance, the creditor had a claim of only $100, the trustee could
totally avoid a seller's right of reclamation even though the goods sold were worth $10,000.
256. One possible limitation on the trustee's use of an actual secured party, a limitation
mentioned in note 249 supra, is that a secured party who perfects will ordinarily defeat the
trustee. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 24-1, at 865-66. This may negate the trustee's
ability to deploy the secured party's rights against the seller. In any event, it may remove
any practical incentive for the trustee to contest the seller unless the debt secured is less than
the value of the goods sold the buyer, in which event the trustee should be able to satisfy the
secured party and still retain the balance for the estate. The trustee will, however, defeat a
security interest unperfected as of the date of bankruptcy, id. § 24-3, and perhaps even a
secured party with a "floating lien" on after-acquired property of the debtor. See id. § 24-5.
In such cases it may be worth the trustee's while to assume the secured party's position in
order to recover or retain the goods.
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these provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, a crucial question arises:
can the reclaiming Code seller still avail himself of his pre-Code
remedies? Several fairly recent cases 257 have permitted the seller to
employ whatever pre-Code remedies he may have had when the 2-
702 reclamation right had been invalidated under sections 67(c)
and/or 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. This recourse to the common
law was allowed despite the exclusivity provision of section 2-
702(2).111 Two courts avoided the operation of this subsection by
basing their decisions upon equitable considerations:
Equitable considerations require that I reject the argument that since § 2-702
is by its final sentence, made an exclusive remedy, once it is invalidated by §
67c(1) (A), the seller is left without a remedy. I find the argument specious and
the notion abhorrent to a court of equity. Surely § 2-702 must be read together
and the last sentence of subsection (2) must be taken to mean that § 2-702 is
the exclusive remedy if it survives attack by the trustee, and if invalidated by
§ 67c(1)(A) the seller is not to be deprived of any pre-Code remedy he may
have had.nI
The effect of these cases on other Bankruptcy Act provisions is
unclear since the case deal only with the invalidation of section 2-
702(2) under sections 67(c), and 64(a). 210 Nor is it clear whether
these cases should apply beyond the section 2-702(2) context. There
is, however, every reason to extend to the section 2-507(2)/2-511(3)
seller the opportunity to use pre-Code remedies in the event his
Code reclamation right fails under the Bankruptcy Act. This is
especially true given the total absence of any exclusivity provision
in both sections.26 Section 1-103 also should preserve the seller's
pre-Code remedies, especially if the Code remedy is invalidated in
257. See In re Neisner Bros., Inc., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Giltex, Inc., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In addition, the bankruptcy judge's opinion
in In re Federal's, Inc. expressly stated that since the effect of section 2-702's conflict with
Bankruptcy Act sections 64(a) and 67(c)(1)(A) was to make that section totally inoperative
in bankruptcy, the seller's right to reclaim the property had to be determined by reference
to pre-Code law. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142, 1153 (E.D. Mich. 1973). On appeal to the District
Court, the bankruptcy court decision favoring the receiver was affirmed and the statement
that § 2-702 was totally inoperative in bankruptcy was tacitly supported. In re Federal's Inc.,
402 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1975). This decision was reversed by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977).
258. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
259. In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In In re
Giltex, Inc. the court followed the reasoning contained in this passage. 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
887, 895-896 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The other cases cited in note 257 supra are either unreported,
or else failed to discuss this point.
260. To date there has been no judicial decision addressing this issue.
261. This would not be the case, however, under the view that all section 2-702 limita-




bankruptcy. 62 Unfortunately, the availability of this "end run"
around the potential bankruptcy problems faced by section 2-511(3)
sellers awaits a more definitive judicial determination.
IV. THE RECLAIMING SELLER AND THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
The discussion above forms the basis for the principal task of
this Article: an examination of the reclaiming seller's rights against
the trustee under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. This section will
begin by sketching briefly the legislative history of the Reform Act.
Then, it will discuss a new Reform Act provision (section 546(c))
that seems to have been intended to resolve the seller-trustee con-
flict. After concluding that this provision fails to solve some of the
problems which existed under prior law, this section will examine
the seller's position under the Reform Act successors to Bankruptcy
Act sections 70(e), 70(c), 67(c), and 60, respectively. It will con-
clude with a proposed amendment to section 546(c) which should
resolve some of the difficulties revealed by the discussion.
A. Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 263
On July 24, 1970, Congress created the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to study and recommend
changes in federal bankruptcy legislation.2 4 After two years of work,
the Commission submitted its Report to Congress on July 30,
1973.265 Shortly thereafter, bills embodying the Commission's rec-
ommendations were introduced in both the House2 6 and the Sen-
ate.267 There was little action on these bills until 1975, when they
were reintroduced without significant amendment. 26 Parallel bills
reflecting the recommendations of the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges were also introduced at this time.2 9 House sub-
committee hearings on its bills began in 1975 and extended into
262. This may have been the view taken by the first In re Federal's, Inc. decision. See
12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142, 1153 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
263. Summaries of much of this history can be found at 124 CONG. REC. S14,718-19
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 123 CONG. REC. H11,700-01 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Butler).
264. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
265. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Letter of Transmittal) (1973) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT I.
266. H.R. 10,792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
267. S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
268. See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
269. See H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
16643, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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1976;270 the corresponding Senate hearings were completed during
1975.271 After further committee work-some of it in consultation
with the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Conference-revised bills were eventually intro-
duced in the House2 7 and Senate2 73 in January and October of 1977,
respectively. The House passed its version of this legislation on
February 1, 1978, while the Senate approved its version on Septem-
ber 7, 1978. After some work in conference committee and House
and Senate action to reconcile differences between the two bills, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act finally became law on November 6, 1978.27,
The portions of the Act relevant to this Article took effect October
1, 1979.275
B. Section 546(c)
For the purposes of this Article, the most significant provision
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act is its new section 546(c), which had
no antecedents in the Bankruptcy Act. Section 546(c) states that
[t]he rights and powers of the trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547,
and 549 of this title are subject to any statutory right or common-law right of
a seller, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, of goods to the debtor
to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such goods while insolvent,
but-
(1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller
demands in writing reclamation of such goods before ten days after re-
ceipt of such goods by the debtor; and
(2) the court may deny reclamation to a seller with such a right of
reclamation that has made such a demand only if court-
(A) grants the claim of such a seller priority as an administrative
expense; or
(B) secures such claim by a lien.26
270. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. (1975-76) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings].
271. Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on the Improvement of
Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 Senate Hearings].
272. See H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This was followed by H.R. 7330, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). H.R. 8200 was the bill
eventually passed by the House.
273. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
274. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11
U.S.C.A. § 101 to 151326 (West Supp. 1979)).
275. Id. § 402.
276. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c) (West Supp. 1979). Also of some interest here is 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 546(b) (West Supp. 1979), which states:
The rights and powers of the trustee under section 544, 545, or 549 of this title are
subject to any generally applicable law that permits petffction of an interest in property
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This subsection negates the powers of a trustee proceeding under
the successors to Bankruptcy Act sections 60, 67(c), and 70(c), but
does not affect the trustee's powers under the revised version of
section 70(e). 277 It also requires for its operation a written demand
by the seller of goods within ten days of their receipt by the buyer-
debtor.278 It does not, however, answer a number of questions which
inevitably will arise concerning the adequacy of the written de-
mand. 279 Furthermore, section 546(c) applies only to sales in the
to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of
such perfection. If such law requires seizure of such property or commencement of an
action to accomplish such perfection, and such property has not been seized or such
action has not been commenced before the date of the filing of the petition, such interest
in such property shall be perfected by notice within the time fixed by such law for such
seizure or commencement.
Section 546(c) works only to negate whatever powers the trustee might have had under
the successors to Bankruptcy Act §§ 67(c), 70(c) and 70(e), and does not affect the trustee's
power under the successor to § 60. See notes 322, 348, 358, 370-71 infra and accompanying
text. This provision came upon the scene relatively late in the legislative history of the new
Bankruptcy Act. Nothing like it was present in the COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 265, and
the early bankruptcy reform legislation did not contain such a provision. See, e.g., H.R. 31
& 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 235 & 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In the House,
it made its first appearance in an Appendix to the 1975-76 hearings as part of an amended
Bankruptcy Act of 1975 prepared by the National Bankruptcy Conference. See 1975 House
Hearings, supra note 270, Appendix 2, at 355. See also Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 2,
at 1165. Here, it took the form of a generalized credit seller's right t6 recover against the
trustee on the basis of common-law fraud, a right which was supposed to negate § 2-702(2)
in bankruptcy proceedings. In the Senate, it first appeared in a 1976 "Staff Report" by the
relevant Senate subcommittee considering the two Senate bills of concern at that time. See
id., at 1165-66; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 271, Part 3, at 120-27 (containing a letter
from Professor John Minahan of the Vermont Law School to Senator Roman Hruska with a
proposed provision almost identical to that of the Staff Report, a response by Edelman and
Weintraub, and a response to this by Minahan). The first Senate version differed considera-
bly from that of the House, substantially tracking § 2-702(2)'s language and providing for a
ten day written demand. The new bills introduced in the House and the Senate in 1977
basically combined these original House and Senate versions by providing for seller recovery
on either a § 2-702(2) or a common-law basis. See, e.g., S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 546(b)
(1977). The language contained in such bills was much like that of the present section 546(c),
and they proceeded through the rest of the legislative process with only relatively minor
changes.
277. See notes 324, 340, 349 & 361 infra and accompanying text. The subsection also
affects the trustee who proceeds under § 549 of the New Act, which involves postpetition
transactions. Earlier versions of this provision included the successor to § 70(e). See, e.g., S.
2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 546 (b) (1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 546(b) (1977).
278. This parallels U.C.C. § 2-702(2)'s ten day demand requirement, see notes 49-52
supra and accompanying text, although here the demand must be written. It does not incor-
porate § 2-702(2)'s "written misrepresentation" exception to this requirement. See notes 56-
62 & 81-84 supra and accompanying text. Also, this provision does not mesh with the "follow-
up" requirements imposed upon the cash and credit sellers. See notes 53-55 & 81-84 supra
and accompanying text. In addition, it is worth noting that some of the earlier versions of
this provision did not incorporate the requirement of a written demand. See, e.g., S. 2266,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 546(b)(1) (1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 546(b)(1) (1977).
279. For instance, there may be problems as to what constitutes a sufficient "writing."
In cases where the demand is dispatched before the end of the ten day period but received
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ordinary course of the seller's business. This requirement should, at
the very minimum, exclude from its coverage bulk sales,2so sales by
a non-merchant, 211 and sales by a merchant which are unrelated to
his basic line of business or apparent expertise. Finally, the conclud-
ing subparagraph of section 546(c) provides the trustee with the
option of protecting a seller who complies with the main body of the
provision by allowing the seller's claim priority as an administrative
expense or by securing his claim as a lien, rather than by allowing
outright recovery of the goods.82
Although courts interpreting section 546(c) will face problems
of a more or less "procedural" nature such as specification of the
"written demand" requirement, the greater difficulty will be en-
countered in determining the exact reclamation rights in the seller
that the section incorporates and protects against the trustee.
Section 546(c) clearly applies to the reclaiming credit seller proceed-
ing under U.C.C. section 2-702(2), with the omissions mentioned
above.2 84 As both the House and Senate Reports to the Bankruptcy
after this time has run, courts will have to decide whether the demand should be regarded as
effective upon dispatch or upon receipt. See also Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 2, at
1171-72.
280. See U.C.C. § 6-102(1).
281. Although U.C.C. § 2-104(1)'s definition of the term "merchant" does not use the
term "ordinary course of business," its "deals in goods of the kind" language fairly clearly
includes a seller with a more or less regular line of business in certain sorts of goods. Also,
U.C.C. § 1-201(9)'s definition of "Buyer in ordinary course of business" envisions purchases
from "a person in the business of selling goods of that kind." And a nonmerchant who fails
to "deal in goods of the kind" presumably will lack an "ordinary course of business."
282. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787, [hereinafter cited as 1978 SENATE REPORT]; H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, [hereinafter cited as 1978
HOUSE REPORT]; 124 CONG. REC. S17,413-14 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeCon-
cini); 124 CONG. REc. H11,097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 1979
COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, BANKRUPTCY CODE, Part 3, at 279 [hereinafter cited as 1979
COLLIER PAMPHLET]. See also 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 271, Part 3, at 126 (letter from
Edelman & Weintraub); note 174 supra.
283. Throughout this section, § 546(c) is interpreted to incorporate statutory or
common-law rights which are themselves contingent on the receipt of goods while insolvent.
The section could, however, be read as including any statutory right or common-law right of
a seller, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, of goods to the debtor to reclaim such
goods, such rights being effective against the trustee only if the debtor has received such goods
while insolvent. In the first case, insolvency assists in defining the right incorporated; in the
second, it acts as a bankruptcy-specific limitation on the reach of rights more generally
defined. Practically speaking, this distinction is most likely to be significant with respect to
the cash sale, which might be excluded totally from section 546(c)'s coverage under the first
reading, see notes 292-304 infra and accompanying text, but would be incorporated and then
limited by the actual existence or nonexistence of insolvency under the second interpretation.
The first interpretation of section 546(c) is the more plausible given the obvious intent of its
drafters to parallel the language of U.C.C. § 2-702(2), which is a reclamation right premised
on the buyer's receipt of goods while insolvent. See text accompanying note 285 infra.
284. The principal modification is the "writing" requirement that attached to the ten
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Reform Act put it: "[t]he purpose of the provision is to recognize,
in part, the validity of section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which has generated much litigation, confusion, and diver-
gent decisions in different circuits. '"85 Section 546(c) also allows the
reclaiming seller a common-law right of recovery in bankruptcy
despite the exclusivity of U.C.C. section 2-702(2).211 The legislative
history of this section28 1 tends to suggest that recovery based on pre-
Code fraud rules was intended.28 8 Section 546(c) also speaks of a
common-law right operative "if the debtor has received such goods
while insolvent." As was noted above29 fraud recovery was possible
under pre-Code law even when the buyer was not insolvent. There-
fore certain types of common-law fraud seem to be excluded from
section 546(c). Moreover, state-by-state variations in fraud rules90
and the uncertainty surrounding this whole area 291 may confront
courts applying the new section with significant difficulties.
The difficulties presented by section 546(c)'s apparently incom-
plete adoption of pre-Code fraud law, however, pale in significance
when compared with another "incorporative" problem: whether the
section should be regarded as including the Code and common-
law2 2 cash sale recovery rights. Section 546(c) states that the rights
and powers of the trustee are subject to "any statutory right or
common law right of a seller".2 13 Moreover, some of the legislative
history suggests that the cash seller should be included. Two promi-
nent Congressional sponsors of the Bankruptcy Reform Act have
stated that it "applies to receipt of goods on credit as well as by cash
day demand. Also, it is possible that some sales not in the ordinary course of the seller's
business may be covered by § 2-702, but not by § 546(c). In addition, the Code definition of
insolvency seems broader than that of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Compare U.C.C. § 1-
201(23) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(26) (West Supp. 1979). Thus, reclaimants meeting the 2-
702(2) tests might not qualify under the section 546(c) test.
285. 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 282 at 88-89; 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 282,
at 544. See also 1979 COLLIER PAMPHLET, supra note 282, at 278-79.
286. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. Federal law would control here on
supremacy grounds.
287. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 270, app. 2, at 355; 1975 Senate Hearings,
supra note 271, Part 3, at 120-27; Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 2. See also note 284
supra.
288. See generally notes 6-19 supra and accompanying text.
289. See notes 12 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
290. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
291. See Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 2, at 1166-70.
292. As in the case of common-law fraud, see note 286 supra, it might be difficult to
conjure up situations in which the availability of the common-law cash sale reclamation right
would be of much use to the cash seller.
293. Section 546(c)'s failure fully to track the language of § 2-702(2) by including the
words "on credit" might suggest that it is intended to include the cash seller.
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sales. '294 The relevant House and Senate Reports, however, do not
mention the cash seller, and focus instead on section 2-702(2) and
the bankruptcy problems it has presented.295 In view of the cash
seller's lower visibility throughout the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 296 this omission might be taken as indicating an intent
that section 546(c) focus on the most immediately pressing problem,
the fate of the 2-702 seller in bankruptcy. Even more troubling is
the fact that section 546(c) refers to recovery rights based on the
buyer's receipt of goods while insolvent. 297 It will be recalled that
neither sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)298 nor the common-law cash
sale recovery right 20 depend upon insolvency for their application.
Despite this uncertainty, the better view is to read section 546(c) as
including both the Code and the common-law cash sale reclamation
rights. This conclusion is impelled both by the explicit references
to the cash seller in some of the legislative history to section 546(c),
and by one of the policy bases underlying the distinction between
cash sales and credit sales at common law and under the Code. The
somewhat greater protection vis-d-vis third parties afforded the
cash seller in both instances0 0 reflects the idea that the seller bar-
gaining on "cash" terms is attempting to obtain, and thus deserves
to receive, greater protection than is the seller extending credit.3 0'
If that is so, to include the credit seller under section 546(c) while
rejecting the cash seller, who is entitled to somewhat greater protec-
tion, is anomalous absent a clear statement that the cash seller is
not to be included. It should be noted, finally, that even if the cash
294. 124 CONG. REC. § 17,413-14 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini);
124 CONG. REC. H11,097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). Also, Professor
Minahan's 1976 letter to Senator Hruska proposing an early draft of what eventually became
§ 546(c), see note 276 supra, clearly envisioned its applicability to cash sales under the U.C.C.
See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 271, Part 3, at 120-21.
295. See text accompanying note 285 supra.
296. Under the Code, cash sale cases have been less numerous than credit sale cases.
Also, commentary on the U.C.C. cash seller's rights against third parties, especially the
trustee, has been less extensive than that regarding the § 2-702 situation. Cash sale commen-
tary has also tended to be of more recent vintage than credit sale commentary.
297. But see note 283 supra.
298. The preferred view is that the Code cash sale reclamation right is inherent to §
2-507(2) and 2-511(3). See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text. If it is assumed, how-
ever, that § 2-507(2) depends upon § 2-702(2) for a reclamation right, this problem might
disappear. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text. This argument cannot be used in
the case of § 2-511(3), which has no express links to § 2-702. See notes 89 & 98 supra and
accompanying text.
299. This right of reclamation was based on the fact that title to goods never passed to
the nonpaying buyer, and that he therefore could not transfer title to the trustee. See notes
21-23 & 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
300. See generally notes 31-39 supra and accompanying text.
301. See L. VOLD, supra note 4, § 30, at 172-78.
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seller is regarded protected by section 546(c),3 2 the provision's ten
day written demand requirement will render the recovery right inef-
fective in many "bad check" cases.3 13 Unfortunately, such cases
comprise the vast majority of cash sale decisions.
3 4
The most vexing question concerning section 546(c), however,
is its effect on the seller who does not comply with its requirements
or otherwise is not included within its coverage, but who still may
be able to defeat a trustee proceeding under the range of Bank-
ruptcy Act provisions available to him. For instance, will a seller
who has made only an oral demand within the ten day period after
the debtor-buyer's receipt of the goods (thus satisfying section 2-
702(2) but not section 546(c)) consequently be precluded from any
chance of recovery against the trustee, or will his 2-702(2) right be
tested under the successors to sections 60, 67(c), and 70(c) much as
under the prior Act? Or, to take an even more likely case, will the
seller utilizing 2-702(2)'s "written misrepresentation" exception to
the ten day demand requirement' be similarly precluded from
reclaiming? 3N Section 546(c) can be read so as to give only the
reclaiming seller who complies with its requirements the power to
defeat the trustee outright. The seller who fails to do so could not
302. Also, the seller's U.C.C. right of stoppage in transit could come within the purview
of § 546(c), although this is on balance fairly unlikely. This right applies where the seller
discovers the buyer to be insolvent. See U.C.C. §§ 2-702(1), 2-705(1). However, it is arguably
not so much a right to "reclaim" goods (or at least to reclaim them from the debtor) as the
sort of right which is intended to make such a reclamation unnecessary. Also, so far as we
can discern, the scanty legislative history to § 546(c) is devoid of references to the right of
stoppage in transit. In addition, the § 2-705 remedy might be classified as a security interest.
See U.C.C. § 9-113, Comment 1; Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller, supra note 2, at
648-49. If so, it presumably should not be included within § 546(c), which hardly seems to
cover security devices or liens of any sort. Section 546(c)'s inapplicability, however, to the
right of stoppage might not be especially damaging to the seller utilizing it, since his ability
to resist the trustee seems good in any event. See Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller,
supra note 2, at 647-49.
303. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
304. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
305. See notes 56-62 supra and accompanying text.
306. This problem could also arise if the seller makes a written demand inadequate for
§ 546(c) purposes, but which satisfies § 2-702(2) or § 2-507(2). Moreover, it could be presented
by cash or credit sales not in the ordinary course of business, see notes 280, 281, & 284 supra
and accompanying text, or even by credit sales where the buyer is insolvent in the Code sense
but not in the bankruptcy sense, see note 284 supra. Finally, § 546(c) might be inapplicable
if the seller complies procedurally but proceeds under a theory of common-law fraud not
covered by § 546(c). See text accompanying notes 289-96 supra. Such a seller, if not tacitly
foreclosed by § 546(c), still might be able to defeat the trustee proceeding under the successors
to 99 60, 67(c), and 70(c). See note 36 supra and accompanying text. However, since the
exclusivity provision of § 2-702(2) probably would apply to this case, the seller would be
required to make the "reversion" argument set out above. See notes 257-62 supra and accom-
panying text; note 321 infra.
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subordinate the trustee's rights to his own. That is, on this view,
section 546(c) would state that the trustee's rights under the listed
bankruptcy provisions are subject to the rights of a reclaiming seller
who (for instance) makes a demand in writing within ten days, but,
by implication, that the trustee's rights under these sections are not
subordinate to the rights of a seller who does not do so. Underlying
this view of section 546(c) is the idea that it is intended to resolve
the dispute between the Code seller and the trustee in bankruptcy
by explicitly stating the conditions under which such a seller can
defeat the trustee, and by implicitly providing that only under those
conditions can the seller prevail. This argument is bolstered by the
statement that the purpose of section 546(c) "is to recognize, in
part, the validity of section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which has generated much litigation, confusion and divergent deci-
sions in different circuits." 37 This reasoning is also supported by the
fact that the successors to Bankruptcy Act sections 60, 67(c), and
70(c) have not been amended so as to resolve the problems discussed
above.0" This suggests that only section 546(c) is to govern the rights
of the reclaiming seller when the trustee does not proceed under the
successor to section 70(e).
Although this interpretation of section 546(c) cannot be dis-
missed out of hand, it fails to persuade for several reasons. First, the
language of section 546(c) does not directly support such a restric-
tive reading of the seller's rights. The section does not expressly
state the effect of a failure to comply with its requirements or state
that consideration of sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 is precluded
in cases where the seller fails to comply. Second, the one bit of
legislative history precisely directed to this point suggests that sec-
tion 546(c) should not prevent the noncomplying seller from contest-
ing the trustee under other bankruptcy provisions. 30 Third, the no-
307. 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 282, at 88-89 (emphasis added). This quotation
was previously used to suggest that § 546(c) did not include cash sale reclamation rights. If
this is so, cash sellers would not seem to be confronted with the "exclusion" problem dis-
cussed here, unless § 546(c)'s failure to include the cash seller could somehow be taken as a
tacit declaration that only defrauded credit sellers and § 2-702 sellers can recover against the
trustee, a contention difficult to accept given the cash seller's longstanding ability to do so.
In general it is difficult to employ this textual language simultaneously to support contentions
that: (1) the cash seller is not to be included within § 546(c); and (2) the cash seller's rights
cannot be tested under the successors to §§ 60, 67(c), and 70(c).
308. See generally notes 341-82 infra and accompanying text.
309. Professor Minahan's letter to Senator Hruska, see note 284 supra, was followed by
another on November 8, 1976 to Harry D. Dixon, Jr., Minority Counsel, Subcommittee on
Improvement in Judicial Machinery, U.S. Senate. In part, this letter referred to certain
unreported comments on Minahan's earlier proposal by Professor Kennedy:
I read Professor Kennedy's remarks with interest. His construction of the section is
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tion that seller recovery rights not covered by section 546(c) are
ineffective in bankruptcy leads to absurd conclusions if pushed very
far: recovery would be denied to cash sellers (if deemed not within
546(c)), sellers exercising a right of stoppage in transit, or possibly
even sellers with a perfected Article 9 security interest in goods sold.
Finally, reading section 546(c) as precluding further efforts by non-
complying sellers leads to absurd conclusions if the section is read
in conjunction with other sections of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act-that is, if the Act is to be read as a coherent whole. If section
546(c) is "exclusive" in the sense indicated, the seller who fails to
comply with its requirements will be subject to the rights of a trus-
tee under the successors to sections 60, 67(c), and 70(c).1'0 These
"rights" are the ability to avoid certain "preferential" transfers, to
invalidate certain statutory liens, and to assume the status of an
"ideal lien creditor" as defined by state law .3 1 Formerly, the seller's
recovery against a trustee proceeding under these sections depended
on whether the seller rights asserted could be characterized as void-
able preferences, or statutory liens, or whether such rights would be
subject to those of a lien creditor. If section 546(c) is read in pari
materia with the successors to these sections, it must be taken to
mean that the seller recovery rights it includes are not preferential
transfers, statutory liens, or rights defeasible by a lien creditor if the
seller complies with its procedural requirements, but would be so
designated if the seller fails to comply.3 12 To take a concrete exam-
entirely consistent with my intentions. You will recall that Professor Kennedy observed
that, "It is not clear what the impact of your § 4-407 is on the right of recovery by a
seller who relied on a materially false misrepresentation of the buyer's financial condi-
tion but who failed to make a written demand within ten days of the debtor's receipt of
the property." I intentionally remained silent on that question as I was not prepared to
state that such a right to reclaim is always invalid in bankruptcy. It seems to be that
this decision should be left to the courts to decide in light of the particular circumstances
of the cases. Here the courts have discretion, absent notification within the ten-day
period, to declare that the particular reclamation is a statutory lien or that it conflicts
with the federal priorities. Section 4-407 merely gives a minimum of ten days worth of
protection. Beyond the ten-day period, the courts could go either way.
1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 271, Part 3, at 122 (Letter of Prof. Minahan to Subcomm.
Minority Counsel, Nov. 8, 1976).
310. Since § 546(c) does not apply when the trustee proceeds under the successor to §
70(e), see note 277 supra and accompanying text, the seller failing to comply with § 546(c)
but meeting the requirements of § 2-702(2) would have a better chance of recovery in a case
under the successor to § 70(e) than in a case in which the trustee proceeds under the succes-
sors to § § 60, 70(c) and 67(c). This seems contrary to § 546(c)'s apparent attempt to give the
trustee acting under § 70(e)'s successor a favored position over trustees proceeding under
other bankruptcy sections and is one more anomaly in the new statute.
311. See generally notes 340-82 infra and accompanying text.
312. In the case of the successor to § 70(c), this would involve Bankruptcy Act determi-
nation of what was formerly a state law question. See notes 177-78 supra and accompanying
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ple, this reasoning would compel the strange (not to say absurd)
conclusion that definition of the 2-702(2) recovery right as a statu-
tory lien depends upon the presence or absence of a written de-
mand.31
3
In light of the above, 314 it is probably best to treat section 546(c)
as having nothing to say regarding the definition of seller recovery
rights under other bankruptcy sections, and to apply it in accord-
ance with its literal terms. Thus applied, the section should provide
the seller with a "nonexclusive safe harbor" against a trustee pro-
ceeding under the listed bankruptcy provisions. If section 546(c) is
not an implicit attempt to define the operative terms of the bank-
ruptcy sections to which it refers, there seems to be little reason to
prevent the fate of the noncomplying seller from being determined
in the usual fashion under these provisions '.3 5 This approach has the
additional benefit of greater consistency with the emerging consen-
sus in the federal courts of appeals favoring the 2-702 seller in bank-
ruptcy.316 Thus viewed, section 546(c)'s limitation on the trustee's
previous powers in certain situations should not be seen as a means
of aggrandizing those powers in other situations.3 17 Section 546(c)
text. It also conflicts with the result intended under the new Act. See notes 346-49 infra and
accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 102(2), (38) (West Supp. 1979) (defining the terms "lien"
and "statutory lien"). See also id. § 547(b) (defining a preferential transfer). In addition, see
notes 365-76 infra and accompanying text. This result would seem especially strange in the
case of the common-law fraud recovery right incorporated within § 546(c), which was never
confused with a statutory lien, was usually not a voidable preference, and which enabled the
seller to defeat the lien creditor in most states. See notes 34-36 & 194-95 supra and accompa-
nying text.
314. It should be noted that difficulties similar to (though less severe than) those
discussed in the preceding paragraph will occur even if § 546(c) is read in a nonrestrictive
fashion. Here, § 546(c) would be read as tacitly stating that certain seller recovery rights are
not voidable preferences, statutory liens, or subject to the rights of an ideal lien creditor where
(for example) a written demand has been made, but that these seller rights may or may not
be so regarded if a written demand is absent, this question being resolved under the appropri-
ate sections of the new Act.
315. Of course, to say that § 546(c) does not attempt to define the key terms of the
provisions to which it refers is not necessarily to say that it allows the seller failing to meet
its requirements to test his rights under those provisions. The section could possibly be read
as utterly agnostic with respect to such definitions, but as still preventing the noncomplying
seller from determining his position under them. The distinction between defining the content
of another bankruptcy provision and allowing or not allowing the seller to utilize that provi-
sion seems fairly tenuous, however.
316. See notes 182 & 192 supra and accompanying text.
317. It could be asserted, however, that § 546(c) does not necessarily embody this
growing consensus toward favoring the § 2-702 seller. In fact, its drafters and sponsors may
have misread somewhat the state of the present law. Compare note 285 supra and accompany-
ing text with notes 182 & 192 supra and accompanying text. The section is evidently intended
to improve the seller's position in some respects, so a diminution of the seller's rights in other
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can plausibly be regarded as one manifestation of a growing recogni-
tion (or rediscovery)318 of the seller's right to recover goods in bank-
ruptcy.
Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act is plainly in-
tended to reduce the longstanding uncertainty regarding the rela-
tive rights of the seller of goods and the bankruptcy trustee that was
brought about by the introduction of the Uniform Commercial
Code. While it does clearly give the U.C.C. section 2-702 seller who
makes a written demand the ability to defeat the trustee, 319 section
546(c) is not a comprehensive resolution of all possible seller-trustee
conflicts and indeed introduces several uncertainties of its own. In
fact, given the tendency toward a federal circuit-level consensus
favoring the 2-702 seller in bankruptcy, one is almost tempted to
suggest that secton 546(c) has left the state of the law in this area
less clear than it found it.2 First, section 546(c) does not apply to
section 544(b) of the new Act (the successor to section 70(e)), and,
as a result, the trustee may theoretically be able to use this provi-
sion to defeat a reclaiming seller despite section 546(c). Second,
judicial definition and elaboration of the important "written de-
mand" requirement will be a necessity. Third, section 546(c) does
not always clearly specify the seller rights which it is to incorporate
and favor. In particular, its applicability to the cash seller and to
certain pre-Code fraud situations is confusing, although the ten-day
"written demand" requirement will probably prevent recovery in
most "bad check" cases. Finally, and most importantly, section
546(c) provides no guidance for the treatment of sellers who fail to
meet its requirements, but who nonetheless may be able to defeat
the trustee without its assistance. In fact, the section could plausi-
bly be read as precluding such sellers from recovery. In view of all
these uncertainties, it is necessary to consider the position of the
contexts probably was not intended, except (as in the case of the written demand) where this
is clearly stated. See note 315 supra.
318. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
319. This assertion must be qualified by noting that § 546(c) will not protect § 2-702
sellers dealing outside the ordinary course of business or selling to buyers not insolvent in the
bankruptcy sense. Such situations, however, probably will be rare.
320. In fairness, § 546(c) does deal more or less clearly with the most commonly liti-
gated situation relevant here-the collision of the § 2-702 seller and the trustee. Moreover,
some of the uncertainties noted in this Article are less probable than is the prototype § 2-702
situation. Also, some of § 546(c)'s ambiguities-the written demand requirement is an exam-
ple-involve matters not easily capable of statutory specification and best left to the courts.
But the situation where the seller fails to satisfy § 546(c) written demand requirements while
meeting § 2-702(2)'s tests is less improbable, and immediately gives rise to the § 546(c)
"exclusivity" problem we have discussed at length.
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reclaiming U.C.C. cash and credit sellers 21 under the various provi-
sions which the trustee may be able to bring to bear against them
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Section 544(b) of the new Act
will be considered first, since its successful utilization by the trustee
could render section 546(c) irrelevant.2 2
C. Section 544(b)
As noted in the preceding subsection,3  section 546(c)'s limita-
tion on the trustee's powers does not extend to Bankruptcy Reform
Act section 544(b), 321 the successor to section 70(e). Thus, it is possi-
ble for a trustee acting under section 544(b) to defeat the reclaiming
seller even if the seller qualifies for protection under section 546(c).
Section 544(b) and its legislative history present a clear resolution
of some of the issues concerning section 70(e)'s possible application
to the reclaiming seller. The Reform Act's resolution of these ques-
tions, however, is such that it is very unlikely that the trustee will
be able to employ section 544(b) against the seller.
Section 544(b) provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or
any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by
a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of
this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
32
As with section 70(e), this section applies to any transfer or obliga-
tion incurred. This language would seem to apply to either a recla-
mation effected prior to bankruptcy ("any transfer of an interest of
the debtor") or a reclamation demand made after bankruptcy pro-
ceedings have commenced ("any obligation incurred by the
debtor") 326
321. Since § 546(c) is by hypothesis not operative in this situation, common-law reme-
dies should not be relevant due to the Code's usual exclusion of them. See U.C.C. §§ 1-103,
2-702(2). But it is possible that the "reversion" argument discussed at notes 258-63 supra and
accompanying text may still be available to the seller. See notes 286, 306 supra. It is assumed
here that a seller successfully utilizing the reversion argument would be able to recover
against the trustee under each section discussed below if he could prove the fraud or misrepre-
sentation. Cf. note 36 supra and accompanying text.
322. The successor to § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (West Supp. 1979),
will not be discussed within, since the argument that the seller reclamation right is a state-
created priority now seems to have been rejected by the vast weight of authoritative preced-
ent. See note 204 supra. Also, § 67(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, see note 248 supra, apparently
has been deleted from the new Act and has been partially incorporated within the new § 547.
See 1979 COLLIER PAMPHLET, supra note 282, Part 3, at 292. Section 547, the successor to §
60, will be treated at length below.
323. See note 277 supra and accompanying text.
324. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West Supp. 1979).
325. Id.
326. See note 245 supra and accompanying text.
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Section 70(e) was susceptible to the interpretation that the
trustee could step into the shoes of any actual creditor with a prova-
ble claim and exercise that creditor's avoidance rights. One signifi-
cant unresolved issue under section 70(e) was whether the trustee
could claim the rights of a secured creditor.32 This question is now
answered by section 544(b), which confers upon the trustee only the
avoidance powers of "a creditor holding an unsecured claim." This
obviously prevents the trustee from assuming the position of an
actual secured party. As the House and Senate Reports to the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act noted, "Subsection (b) . . .gives the trustee the
right of actual unsecured creditors under applicable law to void
transfers, . .. and overrules those cases that hold section 70(e)
gives the trustee the rights of secured creditors. 3 28 This of course
prevents the trustee from occupying the position of a party who, if
existing, would almost certainly defeat the reclaiming seller."'
It is still possible that the trustee might be able to assume the
rights of an actual lien creditor of the buyer, but it is not clear
whether such a creditor could qualify as "unsecured." The Reform
Act's definitions of the terms "security agreement" and "security
interest""33 clearly contemplate a consensual interest unlike that
attained by the lien creditor, whose right to the goods does not
depend upon the buyer's consent.331 However, section 506 of the new
Act, entitled "Determination of Secured Status,"32 seems to be the
provision from which definition of the term "unsecured" should
proceed, and this section apparently takes a broader view of what
constitutes a secured claim. Section 506 states in relevant part that
"[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest. . . is a secured claim to the extent
of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property. '333 This language seems clearly to include within the defi-
nition of "secured claim" a "claim of a creditor secured by a lien
327. See note 249 supra and accompanying text.
328. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS [hereinafter cited as 1978 SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS [hereinafter cited as 1978 HOUSE
REPORT]. Early versions of this section did not include the word "unsecured." See, e.g., H.R.
31, 32, § 4-604(b)(1), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This was changed to the present form by
1977. See, e.g., H.R. 8200 § 544(b), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
329. See notes 116-23 supra and accompanying text.
330. See 11 U.S.C.A. 99 101(36), (37) (West Supp. 1979).
331. U.C.C. § 9-301(3) in part defines a lien creditor as a creditor "who has acquired a
lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like." See also notes 33 & 124 supra
and accompanying text.
332. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West Supp. 1979).
333. Id. at § 506(a).
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on property." Moreover, the Reform Act's very broad definition of
the term "lien"" 4 would easily include the lien possessed by a lien
creditor. Thus, at least for section 544(b) purposes,335 it appears
that the Reform Act intends that the lien creditor be regarded as a
creditor with a secured claim and that the trustee will not be
allowed to assume the position of an actual lien creditor under that
section.
Even if the trustee can succeed to the rights of an actual lien
creditor, this ability should harbor no significant difficulties. Exist-
ing lien creditors are likely to be less common than existing secured
parties. Also, in the case of a seller who fails to comply with section
546(c) the "ideal lien creditor" status granted the trustee under
section 544(a) 3ss would preclude the need to resort to the actual
creditor status granted by section 544(b).317 The lien creditor should
not defeat the cash or credit seller in any event."' If the trustee does
manage to occupy the position of an existing lien creditor, whose
rights under state law are superior to those of the reclaiming seller,
he can avoid the seller's entire claim even if the amount covered by
the lien is less than the value of the goods sold the buyer.3 '
D. Section 544(a)
The first of the significant Bankruptcy Reform Act provisions
likely to confront the seller who fails to comply with section 546(c),
but is not otherwise precluded by it or by section 544(b), is section
544(a), the successor to section 70(c). In relevant part, section
544(a) provides that:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and with-
out regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and
powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obliga-
tion incurred by the debtor that is voidable by-
334. "'[L]ien' means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt
or performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (West Supp. 1979). This generic term
should include (not distinguish) the term "judicial lien," which the Act defines as a "lien
obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding."
Id. § 101(27).
335. This argument should not be taken as forcing the conclusion that lien creditors
should for all bankruptcy purposes be treated as secured parties. Rather, the § 506 language
should apply only where definition of a term such as "unsecured" is involved. In particular,
there is no reason to think that this argument upsets § 544(a)'s recourse to state law for
definition of the "ideal lien creditor's" rights, see notes 362-63 infra and accompanying text,
or that it changes the previous discussion of this subject.
336. See note 363 infra and accompanying text.
337. If § 544(a) is precluded by the seller's successful invocation of § 546(c), § 544(b)
obviously becomes very important. But see note 310 supra.
338. See generally notes 124-66 supra and accompanying text.
339. The legislative history of § 554(b) explicitly states that the section is to follow
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). See 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 328, at 542; notes 254-
55 supra and accompanying text.
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(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the com-
mencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect
to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a
simple contract could have obtained a judicial lien, whether or not such
a creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the com-
mencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to
such credit, an execution against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied
at such time, whether or not such a creditor exists .... 31
All things considered, section 544(a) does not represent a substan-
tial change from section 70(c) .3" The trustee rights it establishes are
effective at the "commencement of the case," but this is basically
the same as section 70(c)'s "date of bankruptcy. ' 34 2 The "avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor" language could be read as permit-
ting the trustee to attack prebankruptcy reclamations,34 3 but this is
an unlikely interpretation.
34
Section 544(a) also eliminates one of the hypothetical statuses
granted the 70(c) trustee-that of the judgment creditor 345 -but
this is not significant here, since the trustee clearly assumes a status
340. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West Supp. 1979). For the corresponding language of § 70(c),
see the text accompanying note 176 supra.
341. As the House and Senate Reports to the Bankruptcy Reform Act put it:
"Subsection (a) is the 'strong arm clause' of current law, now found in Bankruptcy Act section
70(c)." 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 328, at 542. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States saw few problems with § 70(c). See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 265,
Part I, at 18, 200, Part H, at 160-61. Its original revision of § 70(c), however, differed substan-
tially in form (though rather less so in substance) from both § 70(c) and § 544(a).
342. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 303(b) (West Supp. 1979) (defining commencement of the
case as the filing of a petition). Also, § § 544(a)(1) and (2) substantially resolve the question
regarding the timing of the obligation underlying the hypothetical lien, see note 180 supra,
by putting the trustee in the shoes of "a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time
of the commencement of the case." Congressional sponsors of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
have stated that "section 544(a)(1) overrules Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 309 F.2d 224 (9th
Cir. 1962), and In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977), insofar as those cases held
that the trustee did not have the status of a creditor who extended credit immediately prior
to the commencement of the case." 124 CONG. REc. H11,097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. S17,413 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini). Presumably, the distinction between a creditor extending credit immediately
prior to the commencement of the case and one doing so at the commencement of the case
will not be significant.
343. But see Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller, supra note 2, at 633-34.
344. Sections 544(a)(1) and (2) give the trustee the ability to avoid transfers of the
debtor voidable by creditors who extended credit and took certain other steps to collect at
the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Assuming that the seller had earlier completed
a valid repossession under U.C.C. §§ 2-702(2), 2-507(2) or 2-511(3), it is difficult to see how
the trustee could avoid this transfer, since the debtor-buyer would have lacked title and
possession of the goods at the time in question. In such a case, the trustee would be required
to utilize §§ 544(b) or 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the successors to §§ 70(e) and 60,
respectively.
345. See text accompanying note 176 supra.
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very similar to that of the Code lien creditor under subsection (1).111
Both subsections of section 544(a) maintain section 70(c)'s grant of
"ideal lien creditor" status to the trustee by using identical
"whether or not such a creditor exists" language. 47
Thus, for present purposes at least, section 544(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act does not substantially differ from section 70(c)
of the former act. As a result, the cases involving the competing
rights of the reclaiming seller and the trustee under section 70(c) are
likely to be of continued importance. As demonstrated above38
these cases establish a substantial consensus in favor of the credit
seller who proceeds under U.C.C. section 2-702(2), with more mixed
results in the case of the cash seller proceeding under sections 2-
507(2) and/or 2-511(3). Thus, assuming that the seller who fails to
comply with Reform Act section 546(c) is not precluded from recov-
ery, his situation vis-a-vis a trustee proceeding under section 544(a)
should be very similar to that of a seller confronted by section 70(c)
of the Bankruptcy Act.
E. Section 545
Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the successor to
section 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, provides in relevant part as
follows:
The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the
debtor to the extent that such lien-
(1) first becomes effective against the debtor-
(I) when the debtor becomes insolvent;
(E) when the debtor's financial cbndition fails to meet a
specified standard; or
(2) is not perfected or enforceable on the date of the filing of the peti-
tion against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property on the
date of the filing of the petition, whether or not such a purchaser exists;uI
346. Sections 101(27), (28) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 (27), (28)
(West Supp. 1979), define a "lien" as a "charge against or interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation" and "judicial lien" as a "lien obtained
by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." U.C.C.
§ 9-301(3) in part defines a lien creditor as "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property
involved by attachment, levy or the like." Also, § 9-301(3) includes within its definition "a
trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition," thus suggesting that the
trustee would defeat the reclaiming seller in any case where a lien creditor would do so.
347. This is also suggested by the "without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or
of any creditor" language in § 544(a). This language was present in modified form in the
original Bankruptcy Commission redraft of § 70(c). COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 265, Part
II, at 160. The Commission stated that this language was "designed to make clear that the
trustee's status . . . is purely hypothetical." Id. at 161.
348. See notes 182-83 supra and accompanying text.
349. 11 U.S.C.A. § 545 (West Supp. 1979).
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Parts (D) and (E) of subsection (1) would ordinarily be satisfied by
section 2-702(2), since the operation of that section is expressly
premised on the buyer-debtor's insolvency. Even if the buyer is
insolvent in the Code sense but solvent for bankruptcy purposes,350
part (E) should be sufficiently broad to cover the 2-702 situation.
But it is far from clear that either section 2-507(2) or section 2-
511(3) could satisfy either criterion, for neither is expressly condi-
tioned upon the buyer's insolvency or general financial condition.3'
Subsection (2) of section 545 does, however, permit the trustee to
avoid statutory liens not perfected or enforceable against an ideal
bona fide purchaser on the date of the petition. It is arguable that
a reclaiming seller who effected the reclamation before the filing of
the petition could be considered to have "perfected" his "lien"
against a bona fide purchaser. 2 Of course, even if this is true, the
reclaiming seller is usually attempting to reclaim the goods after the
petition is filed. In that case, the seller reclaiming under sections 2-
702(2), 2-507(2) or 2-511(3) is subordinated by section 2-403(1) to
the rights of a good faith purchaser for value, 3 and therefore would
satisfy this test.
Consequently, as under the previous Act, it must be deter-
mined whether the right of a reclaiming seller is to be considered
as a statutory lien and thus as avoidable by the trustee. Section 545
does little if anything to resolve the confusion on this question which
existed under prior law.354 The Bankruptcy Reform Act defines a
statutory lien as a
lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions,
or lien of distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but does not include
security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien is provided
by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such interest or lien is made
fully effective by statute."s
350. See note 283 supra.
351. If these cash sale provisions were to be regarded as dependent upon § 2-702(2) for
a right of reclamation, they could perhaps be treated as contingent upon the debtor's insol-
vency. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text. As argued above, however, the better
view of §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) is otherwise. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
352. This assumes that an Article 2 reclamation right maybe perfected by repossession.
If so, then, since § 2-403 applies only to goods "delivered under a transaction of purchase,"
the fact that the goods have been physically reclaimed and are no longer in the possession of
the buyer would give a subsequent good faith purchaser for value no rights in them. See
U.C.C. § 2-403(1) & Comments.
353. See notes 107-15 supra and accompanying text. The "good faith purchaser for
value" mentioned by § 2-403(1) is assumed to be the same as the "bona fide purchaser" of §
545.
354. See generally notes 193-214 supra and accompanying text.
355. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(38) (West Supp. 1979).
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This definition follows the language of the Bankruptcy Act35 almost
exactly. It therefore retains all of the previous interpretative prob-
lems. Unlike the Bankruptcy Act, the Reform Act does provide a
definition of the term "lien," '357 but since this is substantially the
same as the generally accepted definition,"' the new definition is
also of no help in the present context.39 It should be reiterated,
however, that the three circuit-level cases considering this problem
under section 67(c) concluded that section 2-702(2) was not a statu-
tory lien,360 and these rulings should be of continued significance
under the new Act.
F. Section 547
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the successor to
Bankruptcy Act section 60, 31 substantially modifies its predeces-
sor's treatment of voidable preferences. Many of the changes con-
tained in section 547, however, relate to problems created by section
60's interaction with Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code."' Taken as a whole, then, the new section does not appear to
alter radically the situation confronting the Article 2 seller of goods
who repossesses them before the date of bankruptcy. The operative
provision of section 547 is its subsection (b):
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor-
(1) -to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(a) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or
(b) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
356. See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
357. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (West Supp. 1979), quoted at note 331 supra. This
definition would include both judicial liens ("lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration,
or other legal or equitable process or proceeding," id. § 101(27)), and security interests ("lien
created by an agreement," id. § 101(37)). It should be noted that both of these types of liens
are explicitly excluded from the definition of a statutory lien. However, Article 2 reclamation
rights are certainly not judicial liens, and, as discussed at notes 136-42 supra and accompany-
ing text, they should not be considered security interests. If they were so characterized they
would consequently not be subject to § 545 at all.
358. See note 197 supra and accompanying text.
359. The legislative history on this section is also silent concerning the applicability of
§ 545 to the seller's reclamation rights.
360. See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
361. See notes 215-43 supra and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., J. Wrr & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, §§ 24-4 to -7.
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(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent
at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(a) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(b) the transfer had not been made; and
(c) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
3
3
The principal changes from prior law are section 547(b)(4)'s
modification of the time periods within which a preference can occur
and its related shift in the use of the requirement that the creditor
have "reasonable cause to believe" in the debtor's insolvency. 64 The
latter requirement has been eliminated when the transfer takes
place on or within ninety days of the petition, a change from section
60's four month time span. Also, the "reasonable cause" test has
been retained and the four month period has been lengthened in
cases where certain "insiders" ''6 are benefitted by the transfer."
However, since it is unlikely that the reclaiming seller will often
qualify for "insider" status, this extension of time will rarely apply.
Thus, the seller will be able to repossess at a somewhat later time
under section 547 than was the case previously, at the slight cost of
no longer being able to escape the trustee by arguing that he lacked
reasonable cause to believe in the debtor's insolvency. Another pos-
sibly significant change involving a section 547(b) term concerns its
conditions regarding effectuation of a "transfer." The term itself is
defined much as it was in the previous Act.367 However, section
547(e) (3) adds new language stating that "[f]or the purposes of this
section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights
in the property transferred. '" 31 Although the meaning of "rights in
the property" is none too clear, " it could be argued that the default-
363. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West Supp. 1979).
364. See notes 223-27 supra and accompanying text.
365. For the definition of the term "insider," see 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(25) (West Supp.
1979). Rarely, if ever, will the Code seller of goods qualify as an "insider" under this defini-
tion.
366. The elimination of the "reasonable cause" requirement for transfers occurring
within three months of the petition and the extension of time for "insider" transfers date from
the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the U.S. See COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 265, Part I, at 201-02; Part II, at 166, 170.
367. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(40) (West Supp. 1979) with 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976).
See also note 220 supra.
368. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
369. This language seems directed toward the Article 9 problems presented by cases
such as In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971); Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc. v.
Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969); and Dubay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277
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ing buyer does not have rights in the goods he takes. 7 Under the
U.C.C., however, it would appear that the buyer acquires rights in
the goods at the latest at the time of delivery.37 '
The other requirements contained in section 547(b) are less
likely to present the reclaiming Code seller with difficulties not
confronted under section 60. The important "property of the
debtor ' 372 and "antecedent debt"373 elements seem to be unchanged,
and the problems they pose are likely to continue. The formal defi-
nition of the term "creditor" is different from that of the Bank-
ruptcy Act,374 but this change is unlikely to be significant in the
present context, and the old doctrines interpreting this term35 may
well possess continued vitality. Further, the Bankruptcy Reform
Act essentially retains the prior Act's definition of insolvency,376 but
it now lightens the trustee's evidentiary burden3 7 by creating a pre-
sumption that the debtor is insolvent during the ninety days preced-
ing the petition. 378 Finally, while the section 60 "percentage of the
debt"37 test has been substantially reworded by section 547(b)(5),
(9th Cir. 1966). See 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 328, at 546; 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 328, at 91. This seems intended to stop recoveries by secured parties with "floating liens"
in the debtor's after-acquired property, accounts receivable, proceeds, etc., these recoveries
being partially based on the theory that the "transfer" occurred when the security interest
was perfected, and not at some later time following the debtor's obtaining of the after-
acquired assets. Cf. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 24-5, at 878-80. But see 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West Supp. 1979).
370. This involves the application of pre-Code doctrines regarding passage of title to
the bankruptcy setting. See notes 6, 20-23, & 29 supra and accompanying text.
371. See text accompanying note 236 supra. The nonpaying buyer has the ability to
transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value under § 2-403(1). Moreover, he acquires
a special property and an insurable interest in goods upon the making of the contract under
§ 2-501(1).
372. See notes 233-36 supra and accompanying text.
373. See notes 237-43 supra and accompanying text. The "owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made" language seems to have been added to cope with Article 9 problems.
See 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 328, at 546; 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 328, at 91
(the reference to subsection (b)(2)). Also, the rule that any extension of credit, no matter how
brief, will change a cash transaction into a credit transaction involving an antecedent debt,
see note 238 supra, has probably been preserved. The original version of the revised Bank-
ruptcy legislation contained a provision defining an antecedent debt as one incurred more
than five days before a transfer paying or securing the debt. See, e.g., H.R. 10792, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 4-607(g)(1) (1973). This change was intended to mitigate the stringency of the
"extension of credit" rule. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 265, Part I, at 205. However,
this language obviously has not survived, and § 547 thus might be taken as having implicitly
adopted the rule.
374. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(9) (West Supp. 1979) with 11 U.S.C. § 1(11) (1976).
375. See notes 228-32 supra and accompanying text.
376. Compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(26) (West Supp. 1979) with 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1976).
377. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 265, Part I, at 19.
378. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(f) (West Supp. 1979).
379. See note 222 supra and accompanying text.
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few practical differences should result, since it is difficult to see how
the successfully repossessing seller could fail to place himself in a
better position than the seller who fails to do so under the new Act.
In addition to the concerns stated or suggested by section
547(b), one other provision of section 547 is of interest here. Section
547(c) (2) provides a possible avenue of escape for the seller by stat-
ing that the trustee may not avoid a transfer:
to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms;"m
Although many sales of goods to insolvent buyers should be in the
ordinary course3"' of both the seller's and the buyer's business or
financial affairs and the forty-five day limit appears to be ample
time for repossession, it is doubtful whether this provision will be
of much use to the seller. First, it is not obvious that repossesson of
goods can be treated as "payment" under section 547(c) (2) (A). Sec-
ond, it is not at all clear that a repossession following the buyer's
failure to pay-a situation where subsequent bankruptcy is often
anticipated by the seller-can be regarded as made "in the ordinary
course of business" or "according to ordinary business terms" under
sections 547(c)(2)(C), (D). Finally, a successful repossession under
such circumstances does not comport with the section's "purpose
. . .to leave undisturbed normal financial relations, because it does
not detract from the general policy of the preference section to dis-
courage unusual action by either the debtor or his creditors during
the debtor's slide into bankruptcy." ' 2
G. Summary and Recommendations
On the whole, the Bankruptcy Reform Act achieves at best a
partial resolution of the numerous problems faced by the seller of
goods who attempts to reclaim them before or after his buyer goes
into bankruptcy. Section 546(c) does deal squarely with the most
common sort of seller-trustee conflict-that when a credit seller in
the ordinary course of business delivers goods to an insolvent buyer
380. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
381. Cf. note 289 supra and accompanying text.




and then goes bankrupt-and permits the seller to prevail8 3 if he
makes a written demand for the goods within ten days of their
receipt by the buyer. In allowing such a recovery, section 546(c)
recognizes, with qualifications, both section 2-702(2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code and (where needed) common-law fraud rights of
recovery premised on the buyer's receipt of the goods while insol-
vent.384 Some procedural or definitional problems385 aside, however,
section 546(c) presents two major interpretative difficulties. First,
the recovery rights it incorporates are not clearly specified. In par-
ticular, its applicability to the cash seller is less than obvious, and
it also seems not fully to incorporate all relevant types of common-
law fraud. Second, its effect on the seller who fails to comply with
its requirements (for example, the ten day written demand) is quite
uncertain. If unable to satisfy such requirements, the seller arguably
could be cut off from all chance of recovery. On the other hand, such
a seller might be permitted to confront a trustee utilizing Reform
Act sections 544(a), 545, 547 and 549 without the "safe harbor"
provided by section 546(c).
Assuming, as this Article has argued, that the latter interpreta-
tion of section 546(c) is preferable, the seller who fails to comply
with its various requirements will face problems similar to those
presented by Bankruptcy Act sections 60, 67(c) and 70(c). For the
noncomplying seller almost all the old dilemmas should persist with
full vigor. Finally, it should be noted that Reform Act section
544(b), whose use by the trustee is not precluded by section 546(c),
provides him with an opportunity to defeat the seller outright. But,
as has been demonstrated, this section-which in matters relevant
here marks a substantial change from section 70(e)-will almost
certainly be of little avail against the reclaiming seller.
Thus, section 546(c), while evidencing an obvious purpose to
give significant protection to the seller who meets certain tests,
suffers from important ambiguities when applied to the more or less
"penumbral" situations outside the much-discussed 2-702 context
with which its drafters seemed principally to be concerned. In an
attempt to resolve these ambiguities, we offer the following modified
version of section 546(c). This suggested amendment is intended to
embody the proseller orientation which is plainly apparent in the
section's language and history and to resolve almost all uncertain-
ties in favor of preserving in bankruptcy reclamation rights granted
383. One curious aspect of the new Act, however, is that § 546(c) does not limit the
trustee who proceeds under Reform Act § 544(b).
384. See note 286 supra and accompanying text.
385. See notes 378-81 supra and accompanying text.
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by the U.C.C. or by common law. Also, it generally follows the
overall plan of section 546(c) and does not address the seller-trustee
controversy on some new basis .3 1 Finally, the scope of the amend-
ment is limited to section 546(c)-thus avoiding any attempt at
revision of other relevant Reform Act provisions-because, unlike
these provisions, it is intended to deal with the specific problem at
hand and does not apply in a variety of other contexts for which
changes in statutory language might produce unforeseen conse-
quences.
The suggested revision37 of section 546(c) is as follows:
(c) The rights and powers of the trustee under sections 544(a), 544(b), 545,
547 and 549 of this title are subject to the following rights of a seller of goods
to the debtor, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, to reclaim goods
from the debtor:
(1) any statutory right of a seller of goods to reclaim such goods if the
debtor has received such goods on credit while insolvent;
(2) any statutory or common-law right of a seller of goods to reclaim
such goods where payment (including payment by check) is due and
demanded upon delivery, or where delivery and payment are intended
to be substantially simultaneous, and such payment is not made upon
delivery, or such check is dishonored upon due presentment; and
(3) any common-law right of a seller of goods to reclaim such goods
because of the debtor's intentional or innocent misrepresentation of a
fact material to the sale;
provided that-
(A) except where payment is made by a check which is given as
payment upon delivery and then dishonored upon due present-
ment, such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such
seller demands in writing reclamation of such goods before ten
days after receipt of such goods by the debtor;
(B) where payment is made by a check which is given as payment
upon delivery and then dishonored upon due presentment, such a
seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller demands
in writing reclamation of such goods before ten days after notice
of such dishonor; and
(C) the court may deny reclamation to a seller with such a right
of reclamation that has made such a demand only if the court-
(i) grants the claim of such a seller priority as an administra-
tive expense; or
(ii) secures such claim by a lien.
Nothing in this section shall determine the status or rights under any other
provision of this title of a seller of goods to the debtor who fails to comply with
any of this section's requirements.
386. The most obvious alternative way to address the seller-trustee clashes discussed
in this article would be to attempt amendment of all the provisions likely to be utilized by
the trustee to defeat the seller. As the textual sentence following this note indicates, however,
this approach could pose problems of its own. It should also be noted that the drafters' failure
to do so may suggest, contrary to our positions, that § 546(c) is intended totally to govern
the seller's ability to recover. See note 308 supra and accompanying text.
387. For the text of § 546(c), see text accompanying note 276 supra.
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This revision of section 546(c) adds to its list of excluded Re-
form Act provisions section 544(b), the successor to section 70(e).
Although, as has been noted, this section is not likely to be much
of an obstacle to the seller, there is no obvious distinction between
it and sections 544(a), 545, 547 and 549 capable of justifying their
inclusion and its exclusion from 546(c). In fact, earlier versions of
section 546(c) did include section 544(b).38 Subsection (1), of
course, is designed to incorporate U.C.C. section 2-702(2), and fol-
lows that section's language more closely than the current version
of 546(c) by adding the words "on credit. ' ' 389 Subsection (2) is in-
tended to resolve section 546(c)'s uncertainty regarding the status
of the cash seller by using the relevant language of U.C.C. sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3), as well as the basic test for the existence of
the common-law cash sale, to ensure that sellers employing all of
these reclamation rights will be able to defeat the trustee. 30 The
purpose of subsection (3) is to bring within 546(c) a wide range39 of
common-law fraud recovery rights, including recovery rights based
on unintentional misrepresentation, as defined by state law. These
portions of our section 546(c) would also preserve existing require-
ments as to insolvency and ordinary course of business, along with
the possible problems these may occasionally pose.32
Proviso (A) to this amendment of 546(c) preserves the written
demand requirement as stated by the current section 546(c) and
does not attempt to resolve the interpretative problems 393 this re-
quirement will present, since such matters are best left to the
courts. However, proviso (A) does not apply to cash sales involving
a bad check where the check is presented for payment within a
reasonable time ("due presentment") .31 This situation is dealt with
388. See note 277 supra. There is no recorded explanation for the subsequent deletion
of § 544(b).
389. This subsection, however, should not include the seller's right of stoppage in
transit. Of course, stoppage in transit is less a reclamation right than a device to make
reclamation unnecessary.
390. For the relevant Code language and common-law tests, see notes 20-21 supra and
accompanying text.
391. In particular, common-law fraud recovery rights not premised on the buyer's insol-
vency will be included. See notes 12, 19, 289-91 supra and accompanying text. Also, this
subsection is not limited to credit sales, and thus will include cash sale situations involving
fraud. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text. This approach, of course, will subject
the courts to all the uncertainties inhering in pre-Code fraud rules, see note 10 supra and
accompanying text, but these hardly seem fewer than those posed by § 546(c)'s arbitrary
distinction between fraud based on the buyer's insolvency and other types of fraud.
392. See notes 280-81, 284 supra and accompanying text.
393. See note 279 supra and accompanying text.
394. See note 103 supra and accompanying text. Under the Code, this should be gov-
erned by § 3-503. Of course, the seller failing to make due presentment would not have a Code
recovery right at all.
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by proviso (B), which preserves the ten day written demand require-
ment, but causes it to run from the time the seller receives notice
that the check has been dishonored, rather than from the buyer's
receipt of the goods as in proviso (A). This distinction is made
because dating the ten day period from the time the goods are
received would prevent seller recoveries in many, if not most, bad
check cases due to the time lapse involved with the return of a check
for insufficient funds."' In the "bad check" cash sale case, then, the
seller will be required to undertake presentment within a "due"
time, and then to make a written demand within ten days of learn-
ing that the check has not been paid.3" Proviso (C) to this revision
of section 546(c) is the same as under the current version of that
section. Finally, and most importantly, section 546(c) as revised is
intended to make it clear that sellers not complying with the various
546(c) tests are not thereby totally precluded from recovery in bank-
ruptcy. Instead, they may confront the trustees without section
546(c)'s possible preclusion of Reform Act sections 544(a), 544(b),
545, 547 and 549, thus setting up seller-trustee conflicts similar to
those presented by the Bankruptcy Act. Such an approach admit-
tedly will introduce some of the difficulties section 546(c) was pre-
sumably designed to eliminate, but, as this Article has argued,
397 it
seems preferable to the alternatives.
V. CONCLUSION
Grant Gilmore has suggested that "[iln the growth of the law
there are periods of relative stability and periods of rapid change.
The introduction of some radically new element into a stable situa-
tion leads to a pendulum-like swing from simplicity to complexity
and then, as the new element becomes assimilated, back towards
simplicity."3 '8 This is an apt depiction of the history of the conflict
between the reclaiming seller and the trustee in bankruptcy. At
common law the relative rights of these two parties were well estab-
lished: the reclaiming seller who could repossess from his buyer
almost always prevailed over the trustee as well. Upon the introduc-
395. See the text accompanying note 94 supra. It should be noted that the "given as
payment upon delivery" language of proviso (B) excludes bad check credit sales.
396. This should eliminate, for bankruptcy purposes, the ten day demand and "follow-
up" requirements attached to the cash sale reclamation right by the Code and (where rele-
vant) common-law waiver doctrines. See notes 30 & 81-84 supra and accompanying text. Of
course, a seller who complies with these requirements but fails to comply with the written
demand test will not be totally precluded from recovery, because of the last sentence of
revised § 546(c). See text accompanying note 397 infra.
397. See notes 303-18 supra and accompanying text.
398. G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.1, at 288 (1965).
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tion of the Uniform Commercial Code, however, a "radically new
element" disturbed this stable situation. In the early years following
adoption of the U.C.C. there developed a number of complex and
confounding interpretative issues regarding the relative rights of
reclaiming seller and trustee, all evidently unforeseen by the Code
drafters."' After some twenty years these issues were approaching a
state of resolution as the Code became more completely assimilated.
By the late 1970's the law governing the reclaiming seller-trustee
conflict had begun to swing back to its pre-Code simplicity and
outcome with the seller generally prevailing. The passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act is likely to affect this situation in one of
three highly divergent ways. The first possibility-simple, but inad-
equate-is that courts will interpret section 546(c) to permit recov-
ery for those sellers it expressly benefits but to preclude recovery for
those it does not clearly cover. For reasons discussed at length, this
result is neither desirable nor certain. Consequently, a second possi-
ble outcome is that the advent of the Bankruptcy Reform Act-with
its ambiguities and limited coverage-will generate a wave of com-
plex litigation reminiscent of the unsettled early years following the
enactment of the U.C.C.41° The third, and most desirable, possibil-
ity is that the courts will assimilate the Reform Act and existing law
by viewing the former as primarily an attempt to resolve the old
controversy on a basis favorable to the seller rather than to renew
that dispute on a different level. One way to effectuate this view of
the Reform Act is to interpret section 546(c) as this Article has
suggested it be amended. While such an approach would not elimi-
nate all of the problems created by the enactment of the Code, it
would resolve section 546(c)'s ambiguities in a fashion consistent
with the section's apparent intent to protect the seller and should
provide a basis upon which courts could continue their recent clari-
fication of the seller's position. If this does not occur, or if Con-
gress does not amend section 546(c), it is quite conceivable that the
pendulum will swing abruptly back towards a complexity and un-
certainty the Bankruptcy Reform Act was presumably intended to
eliminate.
399. The legislative and drafting history of §§ 2-702, 2-507, 2-511, and 2-403 is devoid
of any reference to the Bankruptcy Act. See Mann & Phillips, Cash Sale, supra note 2, at
376-80.
400. This viewpoint is contrary to that expressed by one commentator who stated that
§ 546 "should draw the curtain over the long and lively debate concerning the efficacy of §
2-702(2) in bankruptcy proceedings." Squillante, supra note 168, at 1507.
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